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Article 
Copyright at Common Law in 1774 
H. TOMÁS GÓMEZ-AROSTEGUI 
 As we approach Congress’s upcoming reexamination of copyright 
law, participants are amassing ammunition for the battle to come over the 
proper scope of copyright. One item that both sides have turned to is the 
original purpose of copyright, as reflected in a pair of cases decided in 
Great Britain in the late 18th century—the birthplace of Anglo-American 
copyright. The salient issue is whether copyright was a natural or 
customary right, protected at common law, or a privilege created solely by 
statute. These differing viewpoints set the default basis of the right. 
Whereas the former suggests the principal purpose was to protect authors, 
the latter indicates that copyright should principally benefit the public. 
 The orthodox reading of these two cases is that copyright existed as 
a common-law right inherent in authors. In recent years, however, 
revisionist work has challenged that reading. Relying in part on the 
discrepancies of 18th-century law reporting, scholars have argued that the 
natural-rights and customary views were rejected. The modified account 
has made great strides and has nearly displaced the traditional interpre-
tation. Using a unique body of historical research, this Article constitutes 
the first critical examination of the revision. Ultimately, it concludes that 
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Copyright at Common Law in 1774 
H. TOMÁS GÓMEZ-AROSTEGUI* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As we approach Congress’s upcoming reexamination of copyright law, 
academics and interest groups are amassing ammunition for the battle to 
come over the proper scope of copyright. One item that both sides have 
turned to is the original purpose of copyright, as reflected in a pair of cases 
decided in Great Britain some 240 years ago. Both concern the very 
genesis of authors’ rights, a topic of central importance to scholars and 
lobbyists. In England, these two cases are often seen as the most important 
and influential because they are thought to have largely exhausted the 
subject, with subsequent cases recycling arguments and evidence pre-
viously considered. In the United States, they garner significant scholarly 
attention because they were decided in the years before the adoption of the 
Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and the first federal 
Copyright Act of 1790.1 Thus, unlike cases decided on the subject decades 
after 1790,2 they offer contemporaneous evidence of what the Framers and 
the First Congress may have known and intended in those two instruments. 
                                                                                                                          
* Kay Kitagawa & Andy Johnson-Laird IP Faculty Scholar and Associate Professor of Law, 
Lewis & Clark Law School. Research at institutions in Great Britain and elsewhere was made possible 
by a gift from Kay Kitagawa and Andy Johnson-Laird. I thank them for their very generous support. 
This Article benefitted from comments received during presentations at George Mason University 
School of Law, George Washington University Law School, Lewis & Clark Law School, and Stanford 
Law School. Special thanks also go to Howard Abrams, Isabella Alexander, Lionel Bently, Michael 
Bosson, Kathy Bowrey, Jane Bradney, Bill Cornish, Ronan Deazley, June Ellner, Jane Ginsburg, 
Brendan Gooley, James Hamilton, Paul Heald, Steve Hobbs, Liz Hore, Lydia Loren, Hector 
MacQueen, Leigh McKiernan, Joe Miller, Ruth Paley, Julian Pooley, Sarah Rajec, Mark Rose, Simon 
Stern, Clare Thompson, and Lynn Williams for their comments on earlier versions of this Article or for 
otherwise assisting in its preparation. Any errors are mine alone. Many sources for this Article are 
stored in institutions in Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States. Locations are abbreviated 
as follows: AL=Advocates Library, Edinburgh; Bodl=Bodleian Library; BL=British Library; 
ERY=East Riding of Yorkshire Archives; HSP=Historical Society of Pennsylvania; KI=Hon. Society 
of King’s Inns, Dublin; LI=Lincoln’s Inn Library; LMA=London Metropolitan Archives; 
NAS=National Archives of Scotland; OHL=Osgoode Hall Law Library; PA=Parliamentary Archives; 
PRO=Public Record Office, Kew; SL=Signet Library, Edinburgh; WCRO=Warwickshire County 
Record Office; and WSA=Wiltshire & Swindon Archives. This Article also relies on a large number of 
newspapers and periodicals, the full titles of which appear infra in the Appendix. 
1 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
2 E.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834); Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815 (H.L. 1854). 
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The salient issue is whether, in the late 18th century, copyright was a 
natural or customary property right, protected at common law, or a 
privilege created solely by statute. These viewpoints compete to set the 
default basis of the right. The former suggests the principal purpose was to 
protect authors; the latter indicates it was principally to benefit the public. 
The conventional view on this question, at least with respect to English 
law, has been that copyright was a common-law right. This view follows 
from our two cases. The first is Millar v. Taylor,3 a Court of King’s Bench 
decision from 1769, which held that a common-law right existed separate 
from and in spite of a statute enacted in 1710 that limited the duration of 
copyrights. Copyrights were therefore perpetual. The second case is 
Donaldson v. Becket,4 a House of Lords decision from 1774 that 
overturned Millar. There, the House held that copyrights in published 
works were governed by the 1710 statute and its limited durations. And 
though the dispute did not require the House to decide if a common-law 
right predated the statute, a majority of the judges who advised the Lords 
opined that a right did exist before 1710, but that the statute abridged it. On 
the basis of these judges’ views, succeeding generations have taken 
Donaldson to endorse directly or indirectly an antecedent right in authors. 
This long-accepted view of Donaldson has garnered sharp criticism. In 
1983, Howard Abrams argued that the decision had been misinterpreted 
due to misleading reports of the case and a misunderstanding of how the 
House of Lords operated. By his lights, one finds the true import of 
Donaldson not in the views of the judges, but solely in speeches delivered 
by a handful of Lords. And because a majority of the Lords who spoke 
rejected an antecedent right in published works, Abrams posits that the 
House of Lords actually held that copyright never existed at common law 
and thus that the true origin of copyright was strictly legislative.5 During 
the last ten years, Ronan Deazley has taken the argument further. Focusing 
on a part of the decision that Abrams did not, Deazley argues that the 
House also ruled that authors never held any incorporeal rights to prevent 
even the unauthorized first publication of their works.6 He thus seeks to put 
the final nail in the 18th-century coffin of an author’s right at common law. 
Their modified account has been influential, particularly with respect 
to common-law rights in published works. The two most important 
treatises on U.S. copyright law, for instance, have taken it to heart. Bill 
Patry cites Deazley for the proposition that the “House of Lords found that 
                                                                                                                          
3 4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 1769). 
4 4 Burr. 2408, 7 Bro. P.C. 88 (H.L. 1774). 
5 Howard A. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth 
of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1128–29, 1156–70 (1983). 
6 RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 191–220 (2004). 
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there was no common law [right] in published works.”7 And though David 
Nimmer has yet to embrace the revised account wholeheartedly, he is 
heading in that direction. His treatise recites the traditional view on the 
matter but then states that Abrams has “convincingly argue[d] that in fact 
the House of Lords in Donaldson rejected the notion of common law 
copyright quite apart from any impact of the [statute of 1710].”8 Many 
other scholars have accepted the revised account as well,9 and I even 
counted myself among them,10 until recently. Liam O’Melinn perhaps 
sums up the shift in thinking best when he writes, citing Abrams and 
Deazley, that “common law and natural law copyright are fictions” and 
that common-law copyright has been “fully and formally discredited.”11 
This Article puts the story on a new footing or, more precisely, back on 
an old one. Part II first discusses why copyright’s origin remains important 
today, particularly in how it drives doctrinal and normative arguments. Part 
III then provides the necessary context for understanding Donaldson. Here, 
I briefly describe the statute enacted in 1710, commonly called the Statute 
of Anne, and the decision in Millar. Parts IV and V, which constitute the 
bulk of this Article, comprise an account of Donaldson, the historical 
revision of Abrams and Deazley, and my response to it. Given that our 
disagreement stems in large part from different understandings of the 
procedures and records of the case, I pay particular attention to those areas. 
Ultimately, I conclude that my friends have read the record too 
aggressively and that they are wrong to assert that the House of Lords 
affirmatively rejected a common-law right. First, newly discovered evi-
dence demonstrates that Donaldson was not misreported in the manner my 
colleagues contend. And second, no doctrine supports their contention that 
the Lords’ speeches, standing alone, constituted the holding of the House. 
Rather, the correct interpretation of the case is that the House, as a body, 
                                                                                                                          
7 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 7:4 (2014); accord William Patry, Metaphors 
and Moral Panics in Copyright, 2008 INTELL. PROP. Q. 1, 7 & n.19. 
8 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.02[A][2] n.12.1 
(2014). 
9 E.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 43, 200 n.17 (2001); Craig W. Dallon, The Problem 
with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 365, 413–15, 424 (2004); Edmund W. Kitch, Intellectual Property and the Common 
Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 293, 295 n.12 (1992); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitu-
tional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 335 (2004); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and 
Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 31 (1987); Catherine Seville, The Statute of Anne: Rhetoric and 
Reception in the Nineteenth Century, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 819, 824–27 (2010); Molly Shaffer Van 
Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 577–78 (2010); 
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1230 n.328 (1998). 
10 H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the 
Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1221 (2008). 
11 Liam Séamus O’Melinn, The Recording Industry v. James Madison, aka “Publius”: The 
Inversion of Culture and Copyright, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 75, 79, 103 (2011). 
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did not determine the origin of copyright, thus leaving the individual views 
of the judges and law Lords in Donaldson, along with those in Millar, as 
the principal guidance on the subject in England and America before 1800. 
And consistent with the orthodox view of copyright’s origin, on the whole, 
those jurists favored an antecedent common-law copyright in authors. 
Notably, this Article does not address what connection, if any, one can 
draw between Millar and Donaldson and the perception and intent of the 
Framers and First Congress in formulating U.S. copyright policy. Scholars 
have already covered that syllogistic step elsewhere, and though more 
could certainly be said about it, this Article is not the place to do so. 
II.  DOCTRINAL AND NORMATIVE RELEVANCE 
One might wonder why the origin and history of copyright law, 
particularly English law from the 18th century, remain relevant today. The 
answer is straightforward. English law continues to play a supporting role 
in doctrinal and normative arguments over the proper scope of copyright. 
In the United States, at least, there remain several areas where case law of 
this vintage can directly influence copyright doctrine. The common laws of 
the states, for instance, can protect sound recordings fixed before 1972.12 
And thus we still see courts citing Millar and Donaldson to assess whether 
to recognize a copyright in pre-1972 recordings.13 Our Supreme Court has 
also cited 18th-century English case law when deciding whether a 
copyright litigant has a right to a jury trial and in setting the default, 
equitable remedial powers of the federal courts.14 Most recently and 
notably, members of the Court consulted 18th-century sources on 
common-law copyright in deciding whether legislative restoration of 
copyright and increases to copyright duration were constitutional.15 
Quite apart from particular doctrines, English law from this period 
remains important because commentators and interest groups often turn to 
it to support their normative arguments for how broad or narrow copyright 
protection should be. The issue has become especially germane as we 
move closer to what could soon become a comprehensive reconsideration 
of federal copyright law, a step recently embraced by the Register of 
Copyrights.16 In testimony before a congressional subcommittee on 
intellectual property, Maria Pallante stated that the “law is showing the 
                                                                                                                          
12 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND 
RECORDINGS 28–41 (2011) (discussing various forms of state-law protection for pre-1972 recordings). 
13 E.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 254–63 (N.Y. 2005). 
14 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–50 (1998); Grupo Mexicano 
de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318–21 (1999). 
15 Golan v. Holder, 123 S. Ct. 873, 885–86, 900–02 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
194, 196–97, 200–02, 230–33 (2003). 
16 Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013). 
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strain of its age and requires your attention. . . . Congress should approach 
the issues comprehensively over the next few years as part of a more 
general revision of the statute.”17 The subcommittee has since held several 
preliminary hearings on reform.18 And lest we forget, works will begin to 
expire and fall into the public domain in 2019, for the first time since 1998, 
unless Congress extends the copyright term again as it did in that year.19 
Central to the upcoming debate will be the notion of property. For all 
the complexities of copyright’s various rationales,20 property is perhaps the 
easiest to understand and the one that resonates the most. Although the 
concept is not absolute, and therefore copyright as property would not be 
either,21 the rhetoric remains exceptionally strong. Neil Netanel explains: 
Property rhetoric, whether invoked reflexively or strate-
gically, has tended to support a vision of copyright as a 
foundational entitlement, a broad “sole and despotic 
dominion” over each and every possible use of a work rather 
than a limited government grant narrowly tailored to serve a 
public purpose.22 
Bill Patry has similarly noted that “[o]nce something is deemed property, it 
is irrelevant that an unauthorized use does not negatively impact the copy-
right owner, or even that the unauthorized use may be of great societal ben-
efit. It is enough that property is involved and that it has been ‘taken.’”23 
The potential consequences of labeling copyright as property are 
many. Doing so suggests, for example, that Congress cannot take 
                                                                                                                          
17 The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Mar. 20, 
2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights). 
18 E.g., Copyright Remedies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and 
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (July 24, 2014); Moral Rights, Termination 
Rights, Resale Royalty, and Copyright Term: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (July 15, 2014); Music 
Licensing Under Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (June 10 & 25, 2014); First Sale Under Title 
17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (June 2, 2014); Section 512 of Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Mar. 13, 
2014); The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Jan. 28, 2014); The Scope of Copyright 
Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Jan. 14, 2014). 
19 Joseph P. Liu, The New Public Domain, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1395, 1396, 1403–04. 
20 See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2011). 
21 Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 52–106 (2004); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 546–57 (1990). 
22 NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 7 (2008). 
23 WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 103 (2009). 
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copyrights without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, that 
final injunctions should always be granted, that formalities for copyright 
should not be resurrected, and that copyrights should last forever. It can 
also be used to resist expanding statutory compulsory licenses, or even for 
scrapping current ones, and as a crutch for criminalizing more “thefts” of 
copyrighted works. The notion that authors hold property rights derived 
from their own labor additionally suggests that databases and other works 
created with the “sweat of the brow” deserve protection. 
As a consequence, academics and others have worked hard to embrace 
or debunk, as the case may be, the idea of copyright as a property right. 
And naturally, in arguing as much, they have inquired whether copyright 
originally was a form of property, particularly as emanating from the com-
mon law or natural law.24 This is where the turn to English history occurs. 
Scholars like Abrams, and a host of others who rely on his and 
Deazley’s reexamination of Donaldson, argue that before the Copyright 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and the Copyright Act of 1790, 
England—the birthplace of Anglo-American copyright—had already 
rejected the idea that copyright was a property right inherent in authors. 
They then further argue that the Framers knew as much and thus had no 
reason to believe that authors held antecedent rights.25 Copyright 
maximalists, on the other hand, continue to rely on the orthodox origin of 
copyright and argue that Framers like James Madison embraced it. They 
insist that “from its inception[,] copyright was seen not merely as a matter 
of legislative grace designed to incentivize productive activity, but as a 
broader recognition of individuals’ inherent property right[s] in the fruits 
of their own labor.”26 Statements like this and others have led copyright 
skeptic Bill Patry to state, somewhat exasperatedly: “[D]espite [the] 
rejection of copyright owners’ claims from the inception of copyright, they 
have a psychological block in accepting reality.”27 
The reality, however, is more complicated than many assume. 
                                                                                                                          
24 See generally Kathy Bowrey & Natalie Fowell, Digging Up Fragments and Building IP 
Franchises, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 185 (2009); Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete His-
toriographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2006); Adam 
Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005). For a discussion of the interplay 
between property and dignitary views of copyright in the 18th century, see Simon Stern, From Author’s 
Right to Property Right, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 29 (2012). 
25 E.g., Abrams, supra note 5, at 1176–77; O’Melinn, supra note 11, at 92, 98–100, 116–20; Liam 
Séamus O’Melinn, The Ghost of Millar v. Taylor 28–32 (Nov. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript). 
26 PAUL CLEMENT ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION 1 (2012); cf. Edward C. Walterscheid, Understanding the Copyright Act of 1790: The 
Issue of Common Law Copyright in America and the Modern Interpretation of the Copyright Power, 53 
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 313, 318, 331–32 (2006) (discussing the 1790 Act). 
27 PATRY, supra note 23, at 124; see also id. at 80, 99, 112 (discussing Donaldson). 
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III.  COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT IN CONTEXT 
Much has already been written about the history of British copyright 
law before 1800.28 Those prior works obviate the need to reexamine the 
subject, but a few words are necessary to help make sense of the issues 
discussed here. 
Before Great Britain enacted the first modern-like copyright statute in 
1710—often called the Statute of Anne—a patchwork of regulatory instru-
ments prohibited copyright infringement. This regulatory framework oper-
ated (with a few gaps) from 1566 until 1695, at which time the statute then 
in effect, the Printing Act of 1662,29 permanently expired. None of these 
regulations limited copyrights’ durations, so while regulated no work ever 
fell out of protection and into the public domain, at least as we understand 
that term today. After the demise of the 1662 Act, many publishers claimed 
that the common law continued to protect their copyrights. By their lights, 
authors and their assigns held perpetual property rights in their works; this 
was, in their view, a right stemming from an author’s labor.30 
A.  Statute of Anne 
Nevertheless, publishers still campaigned for a return to statutory 
protection. Depending on who one believes, this occurred either because 
they knew that in truth they held no common-law rights or because they 
felt that their common-law rights, and the attendant remedies, were 
inadequate and that statutory penalties and forfeitures were needed. In 
response, Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne, which came into force 
on April 10, 1710.31 The statute included penalties and forfeitures but its 
terms were limited. It protected all books first published on or after April 
10 for 14 years from first publication (and “no longer”), with a possible 
reversion and additional term to the author of another 14 years if she was 
                                                                                                                          
28 Though not a comprehensive list, for England, see ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2010); DEAZLEY, supra note 6; LYMAN 
RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWN-
ERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF 
MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (1999). For Scotland, see ALASTAIR J. MANN, THE SCOTTISH 
BOOK TRADE, 1500–1720, at 95–191 (2000); Hector L. MacQueen, Intellectual Property and the Com-
mon Law in Scotland c1700–c1850, in THE COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21 (Catherine 
W. Ng et al. eds., 2010); Warren McDougall, Copyright and Scottishness, in 2 THE EDINBURGH 
HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN SCOTLAND 23 (Stephen W. Brown & Warren McDougall eds., 2012). 
29 Statute, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33. 
30 E.g., THE CASE OF THE BOOKSELLERS RIGHT TO THEIR COPIES, OR SOLE POWER OF PRINTING 
THEIR RESPECTIVE BOOKS, REPRESENTED TO THE PARLIAMENT (s.l.n. [c.1709]); REASONS HUMBLY 
OFFER’D FOR THE BILL FOR ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING (s.l.n. [c.1709/10]). 
31 Statute, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19, § 1. One part became effective March 25, 1710. Id. § 4. 
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still living at the expiration of the first term.32 A legacy clause protected 
works published before the statute, but only for a period of 21 years from 
its effective date, meaning through 1731.33 Less clear was whether 
Parliament intended to preserve a preexisting form of common-law 
copyright (if any such right existed). A savings clause in the statute stated: 
[N]othing in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed 
to extend, either to prejudice or confirm any Right that the 
said Universities [of Cambridge or Oxford], or any of them, 
or any Person or Persons have, or claim to have, to the 
printing or reprinting any Book or Copy already printed, or 
hereafter to be printed.34 
Also unclear was whether the statute protected works before they were 
first published. Although it prohibited the printing as well as reprinting of 
new books, its remedies were available only during the “[t]imes granted 
and limited” by the statute, meaning during the 14 years “commenc[ing] 
from the Day of . . . first publishing the same.”35 Moreover, the remedies 
were available only if the owner had registered the book before publica-
tion.36 Thus, any coverage for unpublished works had to be by implication. 
It eventually fell to the courts of Great Britain to tackle three basic 
questions: (1) Did a common-law copyright exist independent of the sta-
tute? (2) If so, did an author or her assigns lose that right once a work was 
first published? Stated another way, did the authorized publication of a 
work dedicate it to the public domain? (3) And lastly, if an author did not 
lose the right upon publication, did the statute preempt the right or did the 
statute simply augment the remedies for the limited times stated therein? 
B.  Millar v. Taylor 
The first reported case to address these issues fully was Millar v. 
Taylor,37 a dispute that played out in two venues. In 1763, Andrew Millar 
sued Robert Taylor in the Court of Chancery for infringing a series of 
poems called The Seasons, by James Thomson. Millar sought an injunction 
and a disgorgement of Taylor’s profits; Taylor parried that the statutory 
copyrights had expired.38 Sitting by designation, Baron Smythe of the 
                                                                                                                          
32 Id. §§ 1, 11. For the best treatment of this provision, see Lionel Bently & Jane C. Ginsburg, 
“The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the Authors”: Anglo-American Authors’ Reversion Rights from the 
Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1477–1549 (2010). 
33 Statute, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19, § 1. 
34 Id. § 9. 
35 Id. § 1 (emphasis added). 
36 Id. § 2; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, “Une Chose Publique”? The Author’s Domain and the 
Public Domain in Early British, French and US Copyright Law, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 636, 645 (2006). 
37 4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 1769). 
38 PRO C12/517/45, mm. 1–2 (Ch. 1763–1764). 
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Court of Exchequer ordered the parties to state a case for the Court of 
King’s Bench to determine whether Millar could hold a copyright.39 
Smythe continued a previously granted injunction in the meantime, 
signaling that he believed there was such a thing as a copyright at common 
law—a view he later expressed in Donaldson v. Becket. But, in a turn of 
events that offers a sneak peek at the battle to come in Donaldson, that 
order was modified six months later by Lord Camden, who had recently 
become Lord Chancellor. He ordered the injunction dissolved on Taylor’s 
petition for rehearing, thus telegraphing his pessimistic view of the case.40 
The case then moved to the King’s Bench where, in 1769,41 the court 
endorsed a copyright based on property, natural justice, and reason. The 
majority, which consisted of Chief Justice Mansfield and Justices Willes 
and Aston, held that authors of literary compositions and their assigns had 
a right at common law to control both the first publication and any 
subsequent publications of their works.42 This right existed independent of 
and beyond the terms of the Statute of Anne, which the court believed 
merely augmented the remedies that were otherwise available for infringe-
ment at common law and in equity. Lord Mansfield and his colleagues had, 
in effect, reversed Lord Camden. The lone dissenter was Justice Yates. 
Although he concurred that authors had a right to control the first 
publication of a work, so long as it was expressed in a manuscript,43 Yates 
bristled at the idea that authors could control republication afterward. As 
far as he was concerned, the statute created the right in published works. 
After an aborted appeal to the Exchequer Chamber, the case returned 
to the Chancery. Because the ruling declared that copyright in England was 
perpetual, the Lords Commissioners perpetually enjoined Taylor and 
ordered a master to assess the profits earned from infringement.44 
IV.  DONALDSON V. BECKET 
It was not long before these issues were taken up again, this time by a 
higher tribunal. First filed in the Court of Chancery in 1771, Donaldson v. 
Becket was brought by Thomas Becket and others who claimed that they 
had purchased the copyrights in The Seasons—the same work that was at 
                                                                                                                          
39 PRO C33/426, ff. 68v–69r (Ch. 1765). 
40 PRO C28/8, ff. 84v–85r, C33/426, f. 325r (Ch. 1766). 
41 PRO KB122/338, rot. 372 (K.B. Mich. 1766; judg. Pas. 1769, nunc pro tunc Trin. 1768). 
42 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2312–14, 2334–35 (Willes, J.); id. at 2354 (Aston, J.); id. at 2395–99 (Lord 
Mansfield, C.J.). Another account of the judges’ opinions in Millar, which differs in some respects, 
may be found in SPEECHES OR ARGUMENTS OF THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH (Leith, 
W. Coke 1771). For an assessment of Lord Mansfield’s views in Millar by his legal biographer, see 
JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 191–94 (2004). 
43 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2355–56, 2378–79 (Yates, J., dissenting); accord Tonson v. Collins, 1 W. 
Black. 321, 333, 338, BL Add. MS 36,201, ff. 53r, 69r–73r, 85r–86r (K.B. 1761) (Yates arg.). 
44 PRO C33/433, ff. 413r–414r (Ch. 1770). 
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issue in Millar. The defendants, Alexander and John Donaldson, 
countered, as before, that the work was in the public domain.45 Relying on 
Millar, the newly appointed Lord Chancellor, Lord Apsley, perpetually 
enjoined the defendants and ordered them to disgorge any profits they had 
earned.46 Not long after, the Donaldsons appealed to the House of Lords,47 
which reversed, thus ending perpetual copyright in published works. 
 
* * * 
Because my disagreement with other scholars on the proper 
interpretation of Donaldson turns crucially on the procedures of the House 
of Lords and on the weight to give to certain records in the case, we must 
turn our attention first to those procedures and records. 
A.  Procedure 
An appeal48 from a decree of the Court of Chancery commenced when 
a party filed a petition with the House of Lords. The House would read the 
petition and order the respondent to put in an answer (usually pro forma). 
Afterward, the House would appoint a day to hear the arguments of 
counsel on both sides. By standing order, the House required each side to 
submit printed “cases” four days in advance of the hearing.49 These were 
not identical to the appellate briefs of today, but they did contain the back-
ground of the case and summaries of the “reasons” or arguments on either 
side. Drafted by solicitors, and approved by the barristers who were to 
argue the appeal, these briefs were simultaneously exchanged by counsel, 
and a sufficient number, amounting to about 250 copies from each side, 
would be provided to the Clerk of the Parliaments and to the Door-Keepers 
of the House of Lords. The latter would then distribute them to the Lords.50 
At the time of the appeal in Donaldson, the Upper House comprised 
206 eligible Lords.51 Only three were “law Lords”—a term typically used 
at the time to describe Lords who concurrently were, or had been, judges 
                                                                                                                          
45 Becket v. Donaldson, PRO C12/61/24, mm. 1–2 (Ch. 1771). 
46 PRO C33/439, ff. 26r–27r (Ch. 1772). 
47 Petition and Appeal, Donaldson v. Becket, PA HL/PO/JO/10/3/263/50 (Dec. 10, 1772). 
48 Proceedings on writs of error differed in some respects, but are not separately treated here. 
49 Standing Orders, 22 H.L. JOUR. 374, 381 (Dec. 18, 1724 & Jan. 12, 1724/5); 30 id. at 485 (Feb. 
28, 1764). 
50 JOHN IMPEY, THE NEW INSTRUCTOR CLERICALIS 622 (London, Majesty’s Law Printers 4th ed. 
1788); GEORGE URQUHART, THE EXPERIENCED SOLICITOR, IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR 
59–68 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1773); see also 22 H.L. JOUR. 628 (Mar. 22, 1726/7) (table 
of tasks and fees). For an example of the steps a solicitor took during an actual appeal to the Lords, 
along with the associated costs, see Pearson & Loggen Solicitors, Bill Book, 1797 to 1802, LMA 
CLC/B/136/MS18744/013, pp. 126–29 (describing tasks and fees in Cave v. Otway, 1798–1799). 
51 M.W. MCCAHILL, THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN THE AGE OF GEORGE III 99 (2009). 
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on one of the superior courts of England. Because the remaining “lay 
Lords” had little or no legal training, the House had the option of seeking 
legal assistance from some or all of the judges of the common law courts 
of England—usually four apiece from the courts of King’s Bench, 
Common Pleas, and Exchequer. This was not always done, and the House 
often decided appeals on its own. If the Lords sought assistance, they 
would exercise it by asking the judges one or more questions. The judges 
would then confer and respond on the spot or at a future date after further 
consultation. If the judges differed in their views, they would present their 
answers and underlying reasons seriatim. If they were unanimous, a single 
judge would typically speak for them all.52 The House could accept or 
reject the views of the majority of the judges, but rejections were 
exceedingly rare.53 In Donaldson, as we will soon see, eleven judges 
answered five questions each, and they were not unanimous. 
After the judges said their piece it would be left to one of the Lords to 
move to affirm or reverse whatever decree was on appeal. The House 
would then debate the matter. The number of Lords present during a debate 
could differ greatly depending on the time of the year, interest in the case, 
and interest in other items on the agenda. Attendance on the day also did 
not guarantee attention or participation.54 In any event, it was usual and 
expected that one or more Lords would present speeches in an effort to 
persuade their colleagues to vote one way or the other.55 Typically, the 
Lord Chancellor56 and other law Lords would lead the way, but the 
remaining members were not obligated to agree with them. Thus, James 
Boswell, an author and counsel in copyright cases, noted in 1778: 
[A]ll the Peers [i.e., the Lords] are vested with the highest 
judicial powers; and, when they are confident that they 
                                                                                                                          
52 In these uncontroversial cases, the judge sometimes answered the question or questions without 
providing any underlying reasoning. E.g., Troward v. Calland (H.L. 1796) (MacDonald, C.B.), in 
JAMES OLDHAM, CASE NOTES OF SIR SOULDEN LAWRENCE 1787–1800, at 111, 118 (2013). 
53 See infra text accompanying notes 185–188. 
54 In an appeal in 1703, for example, only 13 of 57 Lords voted. Powell v. Pleydell, 17 H.L. JOUR. 
242 (H.L. 1702/3); THE LONDON DIARIES OF WILLIAM NICOLSON, BISHOP OF CARLISLE 1702–1718, at 
173 (Clyve Jones & Geoffrey Holmes eds., 1985) (Jan. 15, 1702/3). In another appeal in 1721, 32 of 71 
Lords voted. Paterson v. Commissioners, 21 H.L. JOUR. 479, Rob. 349, 354 (H.L. 1720/1). And on a 
writ of error in 1778, 24 of 56 Lords voted. Horne v. Rex, 35 H.L. JOUR. 476 (H.L. 1778); GENERAL 
EVENING POST (London), May 12, 1778, at 4. On the quirks and reliability of attendance lists, see 
Clyve Jones, Seating Problems in the House of Lords in the Early Eighteenth Century: The Evidence of 
the Manuscript Minutes, 51 BULL. INST. HIST. RES. 132, 139–43 (1978). Appearing on the attendance 
list indicated only that the Lord was present and noticed at the time the clerk compiled the list. 
55 When proposing to affirm, however, speaking Lords often refrained from articulating the 
reasons for doing so. E.g., Coltart v. Maxwell, 2 Pat. App. 482, 486 (H.L. 1779); accord Davidson v. 
Fleming, 4 Pat. App. 554, 559 (H.L. 1804); Graham v. Weir, 4 Pat. App. 548, 554 (H.L. 1804). 
56 On the Lord Chancellor’s role in the House of Lords, see Ruth Paley, The Speakership of the 
House of Lords, 1660–1832, in SPEAKERS AND THE SPEAKERSHIP 102 (Paul Seward ed., 2010). 
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understand a cause, are not obliged, nay ought not to 
acquiesce in the opinion of the ordinary law Judges, or even 
in that of those who from their studies and experience are 
called the Law Lords. I consider the Peers in general as I do a 
Jury, who ought to listen with respectful attention to the 
sages of the law; but, if after hearing them, they have a firm 
opinion of their own, are bound, as honest men, to decide 
accordingly.57 
As we will see shortly, two law Lords and three lay Lords spoke in 
Donaldson. 
After the debate, the Speaker of the House (a position usually taken up 
by the Lord Chancellor) would formally put the question as one to reverse 
so as to ensure that if there was a tie in the votes the lower court’s decree 
or judgment would stand.58 The House would then vote by either a 
collective voice vote or a division59 and then enter judgment accordingly. 
There seems to have been a norm, at least among the law Lords, to not vote 
if the law Lord was not present to hear all the arguments of counsel.60 
Thus, procedurally, there were eight principal components of an 
appeal: (1) the initiating petition; (2) the printed cases of counsel; (3) the 
oral arguments of counsel; (4) the answers of the judges to any questions; 
(5) the reasons or opinions of the judges supporting their answers; (6) the 
debate of the Lords in attendance, which included the speeches of the 
Lords who chose to speak; and (7) the vote and (8) judgment of the House. 
Throughout this Article, I use the italicized words as terms of art. 
B.  Records  
Apart from the printed cases and other documents noted previously, 
appeals could generate further records. Of these, the only official memorial 
was the journal of the House of Lords. In the late 18th century, journal 
entries began as scrap notes taken by the Clerk Assistant or one of his 
deputies, which were then transferred to a minute book.61 The Clerk of the 
                                                                                                                          
57 2 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 261 (London, C. Dilly 1791) 
(recalling a conversation from May 12, 1778 with Samuel Johnson). For Boswell’s account of his first 
argument as counsel in an appeal in the House of Lords in 1772, see BOSWELL FOR THE DEFENCE 
1769–1774, at 62, 112–17, 125 (William K. Wimsatt, Jr. & Frederick A. Pottle eds., 1959) (1772). 
58 Standing Order, 14 H.L. JOUR. 677 (Dec. 7, 1691). 
59 MCCAHILL, supra note 51, at 107. 
60 See Chaplin v. Bree (H.L. 1775) (Lord Camden) (“[I] should never be the first that would 
introduce so fatal a precedent, should it ever come to be adopted, as giving a vote without personally 
attending from the beginning to the end.”), in GAZETTEER (London), Mar. 10, 1775, at 2. As for the lay 
Lords, I know of at least one case where some appeared to vote despite missing some of the arguments. 
Pomfret v. Smith, 33 H.L. JOUR. 94 (H.L. 1771); LONDON EVENING-POST, Mar. 9, 1771, at 4. 
61 MAURICE F. BOND, GUIDE TO THE RECORDS OF PARLIAMENT 26–27, 33 (1971); J.C. SAINTY & 
D. DEWAR, DIVISIONS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS: AN ANALYTICAL LIST 1685 TO 1857, at 3 (1976); see 
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Journals would later move the minutes to a manuscript journal, which 
became the official record of the proceedings. Neither the minute book nor 
the journal recorded everything that was said. On the contrary, they usually 
recorded only what was done. During judicial business, this meant 
recording procedural maneuvers and noting when and which counsel were 
speaking. If the judges had been summoned, the journal would often note 
who had spoken and when, and their answers to any questions presented. 
The recorded answers were usually brief—no more than a sentence or 
two—because they typically contain no reasoning. Take, for example, the 
following question and answer from Donaldson: 
 1. “Whether, at Common Law, an Author of any Book or 
“Literary Composition, had the Sole Right of first printing 
“and publishing the same for Sale, and might bring an Action 
“against any Person who printed, published, and sold the 
“same, without his Consent? . . . .” 
. . . . 
 Mr. Baron Eyre was heard upon the said Questions; and, 
 1. Upon the First Question delivered his Opinion, 
“That, at Common Law, an Author of any Book or Literary 
“Composition had not the sole Right of first printing and 
“publishing the same for Sale, and could not bring an Action 
“against any Person who printed, published, and sold the 
“same, without his Consent:” 
And gave his Reasons.62 
Additionally, neither the journal nor the minute book recorded any 
aspect of the debates among the Lords, not even which Lords had spoken. 
Ultimately, the journal recorded the judgment, which could vary in its 
length and complexity. Often it was very short, stating only that the case 
was reversed or affirmed. 
Other records might be available—such as reports of what lawyers, 
judges, and Lords actually said—but they were unofficial and scarce. The 
absence of regular reporting stemmed largely from the fact that publishing 
the proceedings of the House of Lords violated parliamentary privilege. 
Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords claimed to hold in 
their corporate capacities a right to control the publication of their votes, 
speeches, debates, and proceedings. Violating the privilege was considered 
                                                                                                                          
also BL Add. MS 35,878, f. 261r (c.1753) (“The Clerk Assistant by his Deputation . . . takes Minutes, 
and keeps and Methodizes the proceedings and Records.”); cf. THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF 
LORDS, 1714–1718, at xvii–xxiii (David J. Johnson ed., 1977) (describing an earlier period). 
62 Donaldson v. Becket, 34 H.L. JOUR. 21, 24 (H.L. 1774). 
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contemptuous and could lead to censure, arrest, a fine, or destruction of the 
offending works.63 One of the more high-profile reprimands occurred in 
1699 when the Lords censured John Churchill, a bookseller, for publishing 
cases adjudged in the House of Lords.64 Another occurred in 1771, when 
the Lords fined and imprisoned William Woodfall, a newspaper publisher, 
because his paper had published parts of the appeal in Pomfret v. Smith.65 
Despite these prohibitions, by 1774 journalists had become bolder in 
their reporting of parliamentary proceedings.66 Although doing so was still 
a breach of privilege, both Houses of Parliament were becoming more 
tolerant of the practice. Jason Peacey notes, however, that “reporting was 
far from assured, let alone officially welcomed or supported.”67 There was, 
for example, no place for reporters to sit in the House of Lords—they 
would have to stand below the Bar of the House, if there was room—and 
the taking of notes was prohibited.68 
Donaldson overcame these obstacles, and a number of unofficial 
accounts reached the public. Many of these sources are known to modern 
scholars, but some are not. And, of those that are known, their duplicative 
nature has not always been appreciated. Consequently, scholars sometimes 
treat them as if they were each independently reported by different persons 
who were present at the appeal. These various sources are then cited in 
combination to serve as corroboration for a particular point. In truth, how-
ever, on the issues most pertinent for our purposes, nearly all of the prin-
cipal accounts derive from one of only two sources: the manuscript journal 
of the House of Lords and a newspaper account in the Morning Chronicle. 
What follows below are the principal accounts, roughly in order of 
publication. Most are narratives of the proceedings, but a few are not 
(numbers 9, 10, and 12). A more detailed breakdown of these sources and 
numerous others can be found infra in the Appendix. 
                                                                                                                          
63 H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, The Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit Under the Statute of 
Anne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247, 1252–53 (2010). 
64 16 H.L. JOUR. 389, 391 (Feb. 24 & 27, 1698/9). 
65 33 id. at 113–14 (Mar. 14, 1771); see also Pomfret v. Smith, 6 Bro. P.C. 434 (H.L. 1771). 
66 G.M. Ditchfield, The House of Lords in the Age of the American Revolution, in A PILLAR OF 
THE CONSTITUTION: THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN BRITISH POLITICS, 1640–1784, at 199, 204–09 (Clyve 
Jones ed., 1989); William C. Lowe, Peers and Printers: The Beginnings of Sustained Press Coverage 
of the House of Lords in the 1770s, 7 PARL. HIST. 241, 248–52 (1988); Peter D.G. Thomas, The Begin-
ning of Parliamentary Reporting in Newspapers, 1768–1774, 74 ENG. HIST. REV. 623, 627–28 (1959). 
67 Jason Peacey, The Print Culture of Parliament, 1600–1800, in THE PRINT CULTURE OF 
PARLIAMENT, 1600–1800, at 1, 9 (Jason Peacey ed., 2007). 
68 MICHAEL MACDONAGH, THE REPORTERS’ GALLERY 287 (1913). For the layout of the House 
of Lords in the late 18th century, along with its location relative to the rest of the Palace of 
Westminster, see HONOUR, INTEREST & POWER: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 
1660–1715, at 203 (Ruth Paley et al. eds., 2010); DORIAN GERHOLD, WESTMINSTER HALL: NINE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF HISTORY 50 (1999). 
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1. Morning Chronicle—February 5 to 26, 1774.69 William Woodfall, the 
editor and publisher of this daily London newspaper, stood below the 
Bar of the House of Lords each day and memorized as much of the 
proceedings as he was able. Over the course of several issues, he 
recounted the arguments of counsel, opinions of the judges, and 
speeches of the Lords. 
2. London Chronicle—February 5 to March 5, 1774.70 Correspondents 
from this thrice-weekly paper attended or otherwise obtained reports of 
a few arguments and two opinions. Its reports of the other arguments, 
opinions, and speeches stem from the Morning Chronicle. 
3. Middlesex Journal—February 5 to 24, 1774.71 This newspaper offered 
original accounts of all the counsels’ arguments, but the opinions are 
taken from the Morning Chronicle and one other paper. It also reported 
very short but apparently original accounts of the speeches. 
4. Caledonian Mercury and Edinburgh Advertiser—February 9 to March 
9, 1774.72 These Scottish newspapers contain original accounts of 
some of the arguments, opinions, and speeches. Others stem from the 
Morning Chronicle, London Chronicle, and one other newspaper. 
5. Sentimental Magazine and Town and Country Magazine—both early 
March 1774.73 Donaldson first appeared in a consolidated form in the 
February issues of these two magazines. These largely drew their texts 
from the Morning Chronicle and a few other papers, but the Town and 
Country contains a brief note of one opinion that seems original. 
6. Gentleman’s Magazine—early March, April, and May 1774.74 This 
magazine spread an account across its February, March, and April 
issues. It mostly copies the Morning Chronicle and London Chronicle, 
but it also contains two original paragraphs from one judge’s opinion. 
                                                                                                                          
69 MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 5–26, 1774. 
70 LONDON CHRONICLE, Feb. 5–Mar. 5, 1774. 
71 MIDDLESEX JOURNAL (London), Feb. 5–24, 1774. 
72 CALEDONIAN MERCURY (Edinburgh), Feb. 9–Mar. 9, 1774; EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, Feb. 
11–Mar. 1, 1774. 
73 2 SENTIMENTAL MAGAZINE 81 (London, G. Kearsley 1774) (Feb. issue); 6 TOWN AND 
COUNTRY MAGAZINE 97, 110 (London, A. Hamilton Jr. 1774) (Feb. issue); see also MORNING 
CHRONICLE (London), Mar. 1, 1774, at 1 (advertisements announcing publication of both magazines). 
74 44 GENTLEMAN’S MAGAZINE 51, 99, 147 (London, D. Henry 1774) (Feb., Mar., & Apr. issues). 
For publication advertisements, see LONDON EVENING-POST, Mar. 1, 1774, at 2 (Feb. issue); id. Apr. 2, 
1774, at 2 (Mar. issue); MORNING CHRONICLE (London), May 2, 1774, at 1 (Apr. issue). 
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7. Pleadings Account—early March 1774.75 This stand-alone account, the 
first dedicated entirely to Donaldson, spans 39 pages. It mostly draws 
its material from the Morning Chronicle, London Chronicle, Middlesex 
Journal, and Gentleman’s Magazine. But it also contains some original 
reporting of one of the arguments of counsel. 
8. Cases Account—early May 1774.76 This second stand-alone account 
spans 68 pages. It purportedly contains the “genuine” printed cases, 
arguments, opinions, and speeches. The compiler added credence to 
this boast by indicating that he drew his account from his own notes of 
the proceedings.77 This is false. Apart from some paraphrasing, which 
mostly recasts the account from third to first person, and the adding of 
some references and documents, this narrative comes from the 
Pleadings Account. Additionally, it sometimes deduces and fabricates 
the answers of the judges, to the questions posed, from the opinions as 
they appear in the Pleadings Account.78 
 A literary magazine reviewed the Pleadings and Cases Accounts 
several months after their publication and criticized them as having 
been compiled by “blundering editors.”79 The reviewer wrote: 
[B]oth [books] pretend to give the Public the genuine 
arguments of the Counsel, opinions of the Judges, and 
speeches of the Lords . . . but the former bears evident 
marks of having been compiled by some illiterate hand from 
news paper memorials; and the latter retracts in the preface 
the promises [of genuineness] . . . .80 
9. Burrow Report—1776.81 Donaldson next appeared in a collection of 
traditional law reports, when James Burrow published a synopsis of it 
at the end of his report of Millar v. Taylor. This report does not contain 
the arguments, opinions, or speeches. Rather, it primarily prints the 
                                                                                                                          
75 THE PLEADINGS OF THE COUNSEL BEFORE THE HOUSE OF LORDS, IN THE GREAT CAUSE 
CONCERNING LITERARY PROPERTY (London, C. Wilkin et al. [1774]); see also LONDON EVENING-
POST, Mar. 8, 1774, at 2 (advertisement). 
76 THE CASES OF THE APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS IN THE CAUSE OF LITERARY PROPERTY 
(London, J. Bew et al. 1774); see also LONDON CHRONICLE, Apr. 30, 1774, at 415 (advertisement). 
77 CASES, supra note 76, sig. a2v. 
78 Notably, one of the publishers listed on the imprint of the Cases Account, “C. Wilkin,” also 
appears on the imprint of the Pleadings Account. I should also note that some of the compiler’s preface 
was plagiarized from elsewhere. Compare id. sig. a1r, a2v–a3r, with [JAMES BURROW], THE QUESTION 
CONCERNING LITERARY PROPERTY 2 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1773), and 1 JAMES BUR-
ROW, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH viii (London, J. Worrall 1766). 
79 51 MONTHLY REVIEW; OR, LITERARY JOURNAL 202, 209 (London, R. Griffiths 1774). 
80 Id. 
81 Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408 (H.L. 1774). 
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manuscript journal of the House of Lords, that is to say, the answers of 
the judges alone, and the two are identical in all pertinent respects. 
10. Brown Report—1783.82 Josiah Brown next reported Donaldson as part 
of his multi-volume collection of parliamentary cases. Although his 
report appears to be of the oral arguments, it is not. He simply took the 
printed cases and recast them to appear as an actual argument. Brown 
also included the names of the judges who opined in favor of perpetual 
copyright, which he expressly took from the manuscript journal.83 
11. Debrett Account—1792.84 In 1792, John Debrett reprinted in his 
collection of parliamentary debates the speeches that appeared in the 
Middlesex Journal. Additionally, Debrett was the first to report the 
names and numbers of the Lords who supposedly voted for and against 
reversing the decree, but his report of the division was erroneous.85 
12. Printed Journal—c.1806.86 Burdened by a lengthy backlog, the House 
of Lords did not print its manuscript journal for 1774 until c.1806. 
13. Cobbett Account—1813.87 The last published account contains no 
original material and stems entirely from the Morning Chronicle, 
London Chronicle, Debrett Account, and Printed Journal. It also 
sometimes combines the accounts in ways that are contradictory. 
Despite searching extensively in various libraries and Inns of Court, I 
have been unable to find any manuscript law reports of the proceedings. 
C.  Appeal 
Let us return now to the appeal itself. The House of Lords heard oral 
arguments in Donaldson over the course of four days in early February.88 
Afterward, the House asked the twelve judges, who had attended the 
preceding arguments, to offer their views on five questions, the first three 
of which were essentially as follows: 
                                                                                                                          
82 Donaldson v. Becket, 7 Bro. P.C. 88 (H.L. 1774). 
83 Id. at 110; see also 1 id. at ii–iii (describing his methods). Remarkably, Brown had served as 
defense counsel for the Donaldsons in the Court of Chancery in Donaldson and in a number of other 
similar suits. See, e.g., Becket v. Donaldson, PRO C12/64/24, m. 2 (Ch. 1771); Rivington v. Donald-
son, PRO C12/1323/15, m. 2 (Ch. 1771); Whiston v. Donaldson, PRO C12/64/26, m. 2 (Ch. 1771). 
84 7 THE HISTORY, DEBATES, AND PROCEEDINGS OF BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT OF GREAT 
BRITAIN 2–4 (London, J. Debrett 1792). 
85 See infra note 108 for an explanation of the error. 
86 34 H.L. JOUR. 18–21, 23–24, 26–30, 32 (Feb. 4–22, 1774) (printed c.1806). 
87 17 [WILLIAM COBBETT], THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST 
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at col. 953 (London, T.C. Hansard et al. 1813). 
88 34 H.L. JOUR. 18–21 (Feb. 4, 7–9, 1774). 
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1. Did an author have a right at common law to prevent an unauthorized 
first publication of a book or literary composition? 
2. If so, did an author lose that right upon first publication, or could she 
continue to control further publication of such a work? 
3. If a right at common law existed, or hypothetically existed, did the 
Statute of Anne take it away or abridge it? 
The third question is the most ambiguous. Given the principal issue 
that was at stake in Donaldson, it necessarily queries whether the statute 
preempts any common-law copyright that exists in a work once it is publi-
shed. But it is less clear whether it also asked if the statute preempted any 
common-law protections that existed before a work was first published. 
Two other questions, which I have not reproduced, restated the first 
three in a slightly different form.89 The five questions were memorialized 
in writing and put to the judges.90 After conferring among themselves,91 the 
judges returned six days later and began to deliver their responses in order 
of ascending seniority. It took three days, spread over the course of a week. 
A chronology of the opinions (and other items) can be found in the 
Appendix. All the judges, save one, offered their views. Lord Mansfield of 
the Court of King’s Bench, who also sat as a peer in the House of Lords, 
did not speak as a judge or law Lord. It is often said that he recused 
himself because he would effectively be defending his judgment in Millar 
v. Taylor.92 But there must have been more to this given that there was no 
requirement that he disqualify himself in this instance.93 Indeed, many 
observers lamented that he chose not to speak,94 and one legislator, George 
Onslow, later suggested that a law be passed to “compel every judge to 
give his opinion.”95 Perhaps Mansfield simply did not wish on this 
occasion to engage in an oratory battle with his nemesis Lord Camden.96 
                                                                                                                          
89 The fourth question combined questions one and two, and the fifth rephrased the third. For the 
actual questions, see Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408 (H.L. 1774). 
90 PA HL/PO/JO/10/7/373, ff. 310r, 311r (Feb. 9, 1774); 34 H.L. JOUR. 21 (Feb. 9, 1774). 
91 MIDDLESEX JOURNAL (London), Feb. 15, 1774, at 3 (“Friday there was a meeting of all the 
Judges at Lord Chief Justice De Grey’s, and on Sunday night another at Lord Mansfield’s, to take the 
arguments of the Counsel into consideration.”). 
92 Donaldson, 4 Burr. at 2417. 
93 Cf., e.g., Bishop of London v. Ffytche (H.L. 1783) (Earl of Mansfield) (speaking as a law Lord 
in the House of Lords in defense of an opinion he had given in the case below), in TIMOTHY 
CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF SIMONY 52, 167–74 (London, Majesty’s Law-Printers 1784). 
94 E.g., 2 WESTMINSTER MAGAZINE 63–64 (London, W. Goldsmith 1774) (Feb. issue); WEEKLY 
MAGAZINE (Edinburgh), Apr. 14, 1774, at 77. 
95 Henry Cavendish, Debates in the Commons, BL Add. MS 64,869, f. 149r (Apr. 22, 1774) 
(transcription of shorthand notes from BL Egerton MS 255, p. 235). 
96 ROSE, supra note 28, at 99–101. For contemporaneous remarks on his silence, see Letter from 
the Earl of Shelburne to the Earl of Chatham (Feb. 27, 1774), in 4 CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM 
PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM 326, 327–28 (William S. Taylor & John H. Pringle eds., London, J. Murray 
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To state at large the positions of all eleven judges on all the questions 
would be repetitious and tedious, not to mention superfluous for our 
purposes. Suffice it to say that the tally from the journal on the three 
questions indicates that the judges opined, 8 to 3, for a common-law right 
before first publication; 7 to 4, for a common-law right after first publi-
cation; and 6 to 5, that the statute took away any common-law right.97 The 
seven judges who opined for a common-law copyright in published works 
were Justices Nares, Ashurst, Blackstone, Willes, Aston, and Gould, along 
with Baron Smythe. But the clerk of the House recorded two of them—
Justices Nares and Gould—as also stating that the right was preempted. 
That meant that when combined with the judges who were against the right 
ab initio, a majority of the judges had effectively recommended reversal. 
The day after the last judge said his piece, Lord Camden moved to 
reverse the decree. The motion being opposed, it was left to the Lords to 
debate the matter. Five Lords spoke before they voted. Two were law 
Lords: Lord Camden, who had previously served as Chief Justice of the 
Common Pleas (1762–1766) and then as Lord Chancellor (1766–1770), 
and Lord Apsley, the then-current Lord Chancellor and the person who had 
presided over the case in the Court of Chancery. Given the attention that 
scholars of Donaldson have rightly paid to the speeches of the Lords, and 
our disagreement over the weight to give to those speeches, I must say a bit 
more about the views of the Lords who spoke. Unfortunately, many of the 
printed speeches are woefully incomplete, so it is impossible to offer 
absolutes about what a Lord said or, even more so, did not say. 
Lord Camden spoke most forcefully against the common-law right, 
opining that such a right had never existed and that the Statute of Anne 
created copyright in both unpublished and published works.98 He also 
argued in the alternative that the statute “took away any right at Common 
Law for an author’s exclusively multiplying copies if any such right 
existed.”99 Lord Apsley spoke next and certainly concurred with respect to 
published works, stating, as he later recalled, that “he was satisfied there 
never did exist a common law right.”100 But there is nothing in the short 
reports of his speech from which to infer whether he was for or against an 
                                                                                                                          
1840); Letter from Lord Townshend to J.H. Hutchinson (Feb. 25, 1774), in THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE 
DUKE OF BEAUFORT, K.G., THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE, AND OTHERS 277–78 (London, HMSO 
1891); Letter from H. Wilmot to the Earl of Denbigh (Feb. 22, 1774), WCRO CR2017/C243, p. 396. 
97 34 H.L. JOUR. 23–24, 26–30 (Feb. 15–21, 1774). Although he did not speak, the views of Lord 
Mansfield were readily available from his published opinion in Millar. So were the dissenting views of 
the then-deceased Justice Yates. Numerically, they largely canceled each other out. 
98 MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 24, 1774, at 2; id. Feb. 25, 1774, at 2. 
99 Id. Feb. 23, 1774, at 3. 
100 LONDON CHRONICLE, June 4, 1774, at 534. 
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antecedent incorporeal right in unpublished works. It is also unclear 
whether Lord Apsley spoke on the issue of preemption.101 
The views of the lay Lords were mixed. Lord Lyttelton, for one, was in 
favor of a common-law right in unpublished and published works that 
persisted independent of the statute.102 He thus urged his colleagues to 
affirm the decree. The Bishop of Carlisle spoke next and stated that he did 
not want to linger on whether there was, previous to the Statute of Anne, a 
common-law right of one sort or the other. Indeed, he was “desirous of 
having all such [arguments] waved.”103 The Bishop instead urged the Lords 
to deliberate on the question of preemption: 
[I desire that] your Lordships deliberation [be] reduced to the 
present state of that Right under the direction of our 
legislature, which has made, or at least attempted to make, 
certain express regulations in it; more particularly [the 
Statute of Anne], which [under] . . . a fair stating and 
unforc’d construction of it, I apprehend to be sufficient for 
deciding the whole controversy.104 
He could not resist stating that he had little faith in an antecedent right. 
Nevertheless, such a “right, whatever it were supposed to be originally, is 
now plainly circumscribed and subjected to certain restrictions.”105 
The report of the last peer to speak, the Earl of Effingham, is largely 
barren. Although he rejected perpetual copyright, it is unclear whether he 
believed there was no copyright before the Statute of Anne, the statute 
preempted any such right, or both (or none) of the above. The reports 
indicate only that he limited his address to a principle of policy, namely, 
that copyright could impinge on the liberty of the press because it might 
prevent the publication of matters that were critical of the government.106 
                                                                                                                          
101 E.g., MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 26, 1774, at 2. Lord Apsley’s rulings in subse-
quent cases are inconclusive on whether he believed in a common-law copyright in unpublished works. 
In a suit decided a month after Donaldson, Lord Apsley enjoined a defendant from printing an 
unpublished work until the hearing without the reports mentioning the statute. Thompson v. Stanhope, 
LI Hill MS 14, p. 41, Amb. 737, 739–40 (Ch. 1774). This might suggest he relied upon a copyright at 
common law or (more likely) that the reporters failed to record any mention of the statute. Four years 
later, while granting an injunction until answer in another case, Lord Apsley did cite the statute, stating 
that “as long as [works] continued to remain in manuscript, they were protected by the act of Par-
liament.” Coleman v. Wheble (Ch. 1778), in MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 4, 1778, at 2; see 
also Coleman v. Wheble, PRO C33/449, f. 186r–v (Ch. 1778). This too is inconclusive, however, as he 
might simply have concluded that the statute preempted a preexisting copyright in unpublished works. 
102 MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 26, 1774, at 2. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 3. The Bishop had previously expressed his views on the subject and argued against a 
common-law right in published works. [EDMUND LAW (BISHOP OF CARLISLE)], OBSERVATIONS 
OCCASIONED BY THE CONTEST ABOUT LITERARY PROPERTY 14–15 (Cambridge, T. & J. Merrill 1770). 
106 MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 26, 1774, at 3. 
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Lastly, we also know the views of the Bishop of St. Asaph, even 
though he did not utter a speech. He believed there never was a common-
law right and that recognizing as much would disadvantage the public.107 
At the close of the debate, the House voted to reverse the decree by 
taking a collective voice vote.108 Unfortunately, the 84 Lords listed as in 
attendance that day were not asked to answer the same questions as the 
judges.109 As a result, the outcome was clear, but the reasoning supporting 
it was not. Reversal of the decree meant that thenceforth copyrights in 
published works were governed by the Statute of Anne and its limited 
durations. Yet, was it because copyright had never existed at common law 
or because it no longer existed due to statutory preemption? Moreover, 
given that the statute did not expressly protect works while they remained 
unpublished, did a common-law copyright protect those works? Did the 
statute implicitly protect them? Or did works have to be published (and 
thereby fall under the statute) in order to receive protection? 
D.  Perceptions 
Not surprisingly, Donaldson engendered confusion. I leave for Part V 
a more detailed discussion of how advocates and judges interpreted the 
decision. Here, it suffices to summarize, as a spectrum, the differing views 
of commentators. (1) On one end, some observers described Donaldson as 
having rejected both types of antecedent common-law rights.110 Others 
                                                                                                                          
107 2 JONATHAN SHIPLEY, THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT REVEREND JONATHAN SHIPLEY, D.D. LORD 
BISHOP OF ST. ASAPH 201 (London, T. Cadell 1792) (seeming to limit his view to published works). 
108 34 H.L. JOUR. 32 (Feb. 22, 1774). It is often said by scholars who rely on the Cobbett Account 
that the vote to reverse was 22 to 11. E.g., Abrams, supra note 5, at 1158, 1164 (citing 17 COBBETT, 
supra note 87, at col. 1003). This is incorrect on two counts. First, the division Cobbett reported was 21 
to 11; scholars have accidentally treated the Bishop of Litchfield and Coventry as two persons. Second, 
the source that Cobbett relied upon, Debrett, confused the vote in Donaldson with a vote on a 
subsequent bill to extend the statutory term for certain works. The names of the persons Debrett 
reported as being for or against the decree, see 7 HISTORY, supra note 84, at 4, were actually those who 
were for or against proceeding with the bill, see 34 H.L. JOUR. 232 (June 2, 1774) (rejecting the bill by 
employing a procedural stratagem); MS Minutes of the House of Lords, PA HL/PO/JO/5/1/121 (June 2, 
1774) (recording the division as 21 to 11); EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, June 7, 1774, at 357 (listing the 
32 Lords who voted); accord William C. Lowe, Politics in the House of Lords, 1760–1775, at 853 n.55 
(1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University). In truth, as Rose correctly suspected, the 
vote in Donaldson occurred without a division. ROSE, supra note 28, at 102. This means that the Lords 
were not asked to physically divide to make their numbers more transparent than in a collective voice 
vote. Thus, contrary to what Debrett has led us to believe for over 200 years, we do not know the 
number of Lords who voted, their names, or how they each voted. The only insight we have on the 
collective voice vote, apart from the outcome, is a newspaper report stating that “[n]othing was heard 
but the word CONTENT.” EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, Mar. 1, 1774, at 132, cited in ROSE, supra note 
28, at 102. Assuming this to be true, it does not mean that every Lord voted to reverse. Rather, it seems 
more likely that those inclined to affirm remained silent after hearing that theirs was a lost cause. 
109 34 H.L. JOUR. 32 (Feb. 22, 1774). 
110 E.g., 2 RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 393–94 
(London, T. Payne 1792); cf. WILLIAM KENRICK, AN ADDRESS TO THE ARTISTS AND MANUFAC-
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thought it rejected only a common-law right in published works.111 (2) In 
the middle were those who followed the lead of Justice Blackstone in his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England. He stated the holding narrowly: 
once a work was published it was governed solely by the durational terms 
of the Statute of Anne.112 (3) Another approach, which was consistent with 
the approach taken by Justice Blackstone, was to acknowledge implicitly 
that the reasoning of the House was indiscernible and to then rely on the 
opinions or answers of the judges, the speeches of the Lords, the opinions 
in Millar, or some combination thereof to describe the law on antecedent 
rights. Consider the following summary: 
[T]he decision in [Millar] . . . was overturned by this decision 
of the majority of the twelve Judges, and the law settled as 
follows. That an author had at common law a property in his 
work, and the sole right of printing and publishing the same, 
and that when printed or published, the law did not take this 
right away, but that by the statute 8th Ann, an author has no 
copy-right, after the expiration of the several terms created 
thereby.113 
Notably, these early observations did not state that the House of Lords, as a 
body, had adjudged that there was an antecedent common-law right. 
Lastly, a fourth (4) posture on the other end of the spectrum emerged: 
namely, that the House did affirmatively hold that there was an antecedent 
copyright at common law, based in property, but that it was preempted.114 
Deazley has demonstrated that the third and fourth readings have 
percolated through the cases and literature and come to predominate over 
                                                                                                                          
TURERS OF GREAT BRITAIN 64–68 (London, Domville et al. 1774) (semble); but see 51 MONTHLY 
REVIEW, supra note 79, at 276, 280–81 (criticizing Kenrick as misconstruing the law after Donaldson). 
111 E.g., 1 WILLIAM THOMAS AYRES, A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 
ENGLISH AND IRISH STATUTE AND COMMON LAW 315–18 & n.b (London, E. Brooke 1780). 
112 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 407 & n.h (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 7th ed. 1775); see also, e.g., 5 MATTHEW BACON & HENRY GWILLIM, A NEW 
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 601 (London, A. Strahan 5th ed. 1798); 1 RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, A 
NEW LAW DICTIONARY 122 (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall 1792); 5 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST 
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 570 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1780). 
113 2 LEGAL RECREATIONS, OR POPULAR AMUSEMENTS ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 130–31 
(London, J. Bew et al. [1793]); see also, e.g., EDWARD CHRISTIAN, NOTES TO BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES, Bk. II, at 576–77 (Dublin, P. Byrne 1797); EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 37–42, 116–17 (Boston, Little et al. 1879); 1 
WILLIAM HAWKINS & THOMAS LEACH, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 477 n.7 (London, T. 
Whieldon 6th ed. [1787]); 1 THOMAS W. WILLIAMS, AN ABRIDGMENT OF CASES ARGUED AND 
DETERMINED IN THE COURTS OF LAW 117–20 (London, G.G. & J. Robinson 1798). 
114 E.g., AN ADDRESS TO THE PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN ON THE CLAIMS OF AUTHORS TO 
THEIR OWN COPY-RIGHT 14, 39–44 (London, Longman et al. 2d ed. 1813). 
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most others.115 Whether one relies on the cumulative views of the jurists or 
the “holding” of the House, those readings have, in a real sense, become 
the conventional view of Donaldson and the purported origin of copyright 
in 18th-century England: copyright was not created by statute but origina-
ted as a property right, inherent in authors, and protected at common law. 
V.  REINTERPRETATIONS OF THE ORIGIN OF COPYRIGHT 
In the last fifty years, four scholars have challenged the conventional 
interpretations of Donaldson. For some, their historical reexaminations 
have been incidental to other scholarly objectives. These include John 
Whicher and Mark Rose, to whom I will return in a moment. But for two 
scholars in particular—Howard Abrams and Ronan Deazley—their 
principal aim has been to demonstrate that the true origin of copyright was 
statutory. In their view, the House of Lords held, as a body, that there 
never was any such thing as a copyright at common law after first 
publication. The true origin of copyright in published works was thus 
strictly legislative. Deazley has gone further and argued, more 
controversially to some, that the House also affirmatively ruled that 
authors held no common-law copyrights in their works before first publish-
ing them. Thus, by their lights, the only correct view of Donaldson is one 
of the two possibilities offered by the first perspective described above. 
Their argument comprises two parts. First, the official journal of the 
House of Lords (as reflected in the journal itself or the Burrow and Brown 
Reports) misreported the views of one of the judges. This concealed the 
true position of the majority and misled readers into thinking the House 
had adopted the reasoning of the judges. Second, in any case, the Lords’ 
speeches constituted the reasoning of the House and thus the law of 
England. The following sections recount and critique these arguments. 
A.  Arguments 
John Whicher was the first to argue that the Burrow and Brown 
Reports misrepresented the views of one of the judges—Justice Nares of 
the Common Pleas.116 The questionable reporting relates to the third and 
fifth questions. On both, the Burrow Report recorded the judges as 6 to 5 in 
favor of preemption. With regard to Nares in particular, it described him as 
siding with the majority and opining that there was a common-law right 
                                                                                                                          
115 RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT: HISTORY, THEORY, LANGUAGE 23–97, 167–77 
(2006); DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 218–19; accord Seville, supra note 9, at 828–67. I would add, based 
on my own review of the cases and literature, that the second perspective is also very common. 
116 John F. Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry into the Constitutional 
Distribution of Powers over the Law of Literary Property in the United States (pt. 1), 9 BULL. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 102, 126–30 (1961). Whicher (and later Abrams after him) did not know 
that the two Reports were, in this respect, based on the manuscript journal of the House of Lords. 
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but that it was “taken away” by the Statute of Anne. The Brown Report, 
correspondingly, listed Nares as one of the six judges in the majority that 
opined against the perpetuity.117 Whicher discovered, however, that the 
Pleadings and Cases Accounts from 1774 recorded Nares as stating that 
the statute did not abridge the right. Believing the accounts were written by 
different observers, he wrote that the “two anonymous reporters bear 
common witness that Justice Nares vigorously supported the common law 
right and opposed the idea of statutory preemption.”118 Whicher thus 
posited that in reality a majority of the judges, 6 to 5, may have opined that 
copyright was perpetual. His revised tally was incidental to his thesis, and 
he did not go so far as to argue that the House had ruled that common-law 
copyright never existed. Instead, he thought the grounds were opaque.119 
Nevertheless, his findings served as a point of departure for others. 
Howard Abrams was the first to pick things up where Whicher left off, 
and in a seminal article in 1983 he argued that judges, lawyers, and 
scholars had confounded the true holding of Donaldson for over 200 years. 
According to Abrams, students of the case have improperly relied on the 
judges’ answers, rather than the Lords’ speeches, and have done so partly 
due to the misreported tally and partly due to misunderstanding how the 
House of Lords operated.120 On the first point, Abrams starts by noting that 
the most frequently cited reports of the case, the Burrow and Brown 
Reports, contain the judges’ answers alone.121 Aggravating matters, he con-
tends, those same reports incorrectly indicated that a majority of the judges 
recommended reversing the decree. Here, he accepts Whicher’s theory that 
Justice Nares was misreported. If Nares had been reported accurately, 
Abrams argues, the Burrow and Brown Reports would have shown that a 
majority of the judges actually advised the House that a common-law right 
in published works survived the statute and that therefore the House ought 
to affirm.122 That viewpoint would then have to be reconciled with the fact 
the House reversed. Abrams suspects that if faced with that inconsistency, 
the bench, bar, and commentators might have segregated the judges’ 
answers from the Lords’ speeches and focused on the latter. 
Decoupling the speaking Lords from the judges, he additionally 
argues, was something that should have been done in any event given that 
                                                                                                                          
117 Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 2410, 7 Bro. P.C. 88, 110 (H.L. 1774). 
118 Whicher, supra note 116, at 129–30 (citing PLEADINGS, supra note 75, at 17–18; CASES, supra 
note 76, at 35); see also, e.g., PLEADINGS, supra note 75, at 17 (“[Justice Nares] stated to the House 
why he thought a Common Law right in Literary Property did exist, and why the statute of Queen Anne 
did not take it away.”). 
119 Whicher, supra note 116, at 126, 130. 
120 Abrams, supra note 5, at 1128–29, 1156–57. 
121 Id. at 1169–70. 
122 Id. at 1160 n.175, 1164 n.189, 1164–70, 1188 n.(a). 
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it was always the House, and not the judges, who decided the appeal.123 
Starting with the premise that the speeches of the Lords were the “law of 
the case,”124 Abrams discusses all five Lords to varying degrees—Lord 
Camden at length and the others only briefly. He then extrapolates that the 
House of Lords as an institution “firmly rejected the existence of [an ante-
cedent] common law copyright” and that as a consequence there was “no 
historical justification whatsoever for the claim that copyright was re-
cognized as a common law right of an author.”125 More recently, Abrams 
has reaffirmed this position: “[T]he fact is . . . the House of Lords decided 
the case on the ground that copyright did not exist at common law.”126 
Mark Rose was next to cast a skeptical, but more reserved, eye at 
Donaldson. Rose revealed that the Morning Chronicle was the first to 
recount Justice Nares’s opinion, and that it too recorded that he was for a 
perpetual right after the statute.127 Noting that the Chronicle’s publisher 
William Woodfall was renowned for his accuracy in parliamentary 
reporting, and that the stand-alone accounts, together with other newspaper 
tallies, confirmed Woodfall’s account, Rose bolstered the view that the 
Lords’ journal (and thus the Burrow and Brown Reports) should have 
recorded the judges as 6 to 5 for a perpetual copyright.128 Somehow, the 
clerk in the House must have misunderstood Nares. Rose also agreed with 
Abrams that the mistake probably created a false sense of security that the 
House simply followed the recommendation of the judges.129 Notably, 
however, Rose denies Abrams’s claim on the true reasoning of Donaldson. 
The most one can draw from the case on this point, Rose argues, was that 
the House left the preexistence of common-law copyrights undecided.130 
This brings us to Ronan Deazley, who has buttressed and expanded 
Abrams’s conclusions. His outstanding work partly seeks to undercut the 
reasoning of the judges who supported perpetual copyright in Millar and 
Donaldson.131 But more important for our purposes, Deazley also argues, 
like Abrams, that the holding in Donaldson has been misunderstood and 
perhaps manipulated over the course of 200 years.132 After adopting the 
revised Nares tally, he likewise posits that the misreported count has led 
readers of Donaldson to wrongly believe that the judges’ answers 
                                                                                                                          
123 Id. at 1160–61. 
124 Id. at 1169. 
125 Id. at 1128; see also id. at 1164, 1184, 1186. 
126 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:6 n.4 (2014). 
127 Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern 
Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 67, 81–82 n.55 (1988). 
128 ROSE, supra note 28, at 98–99, 154–58. 
129 Id. at 157–58. 
130 Id. at 102–03 & n.7; Rose, supra note 127, at 83 n.63. 
131 DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 1–85. 
132 Id. at 218–19; Ronan Deazley, The Myth of Copyright at Common Law, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
106, 118, 130 (2003). 
 28 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1 
“represent[ed] an accurate summary of the collective opinion of the House 
itself.”133 He goes further than Abrams in one respect, however. Deazley 
argues the House also ruled there never was a common-law copyright in 
unpublished works. Undertaking his own review of the speeches, Deazley 
contends a majority of them “explicitly denied the existence of any 
common law right ab initio.”134 He then insists, as Abrams did before him, 
that due to the appellate process of the time we must conclude that the 
House as a whole “embraced” that position.135 Deazley’s expansion into 
unpublished works has been the most controversial part of his scholarship, 
but he seemed unwilling to cede the existence of an incorporeal right in 
these works, perhaps recognizing that to do so might be an admission that 
copyright still had as its origin a natural or customary right of the author.136 
B.  Response 
The widespread influence of the modified account has been well 
deserved; they have made a good case for it. Nevertheless, I must 
respectfully disagree with my colleagues. My counterpoints are several, 
and I believe they suffice to refute, or at least call into question, the two 
main points made by these scholars. 
1.  Justice Nares 
To start, the evidence uncovered on Justice Nares’s views is not as 
well supported as it has been made it out to be. Although there appear to be 
various narratives that support the revised view—e.g., the Morning 
Chronicle, Gentleman’s Magazine, Pleadings Account, Cases Account, and 
Cobbett Account—they all stem from the first of these: William 
Woodfall’s report in the Chronicle.137 The two stand-alone accounts from 
1774, for example, based their accounts on the Chronicle, either directly or 
indirectly. The Pleadings Account is taken verbatim, and though the Cases 
Account differs slightly it is clearly copied from the Pleadings Account. 
Justice Nares spoke for nearly an hour and yet the two accounts 
summarized his opinion in only a few paragraphs, touching the very same 
issues, and in nearly the same way.138 It is true that the Cases Account adds 
something not seen in the Pleadings Account or in the Chronicle—
individual answers to each of the five questions posed to Justice Nares—
but those answers were fabricated to track what had already been 
                                                                                                                          
133 Deazley, supra note 132, at 132; see also id. at 118, 125. 
134 DEAZLEY, supra note 115, at 20 (first emphasis added). 
135 DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 210; see also id. at 217, 220. 
136 Deazley leaves open the possibility that unpublished manuscripts were protected at common 
law by a corporeal right stemming from ownership of the manuscript itself. Id. at 197–205. 
137 See supra text accompanying notes 69–87 and infra Appendix. 
138 PLEADINGS, supra note 75, at 17–18; CASES, supra note 76, at 35. 
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plagiarized from Woodfall. This was something the Cases Account 
compiler did when Woodfall had not already provided answers. 
There are other London newspapers that agree with Woodfall’s 
account, but they are not narratives and are, in any event, suspect. They 
typically summarize the judges’ positions on whether copyright was 
perpetual. In his work on Donaldson, Rose relies on a number of these.139 
There are others as well.140 Similar summaries and tallies also made their 
way into newspapers elsewhere in England and Ireland,141 and even into 
the letters of persons in London coffeehouses.142 Yet there is no evidence 
they were written by correspondents who attended the appeal on the day 
Justice Nares spoke. Rather, it is much more likely they copied the news 
from other newspapers, which was a widespread practice at the time.143 
Can we conclude the Chronicle was the progenitor of them all? It 
certainly is possible. Woodfall was the first to recount Nares’s opinion—an 
opinion Woodfall published on the morning of February 16—and nearly all 
the other London papers were published one or more days afterward.144 It 
was also a regular practice of London papers to rely on Woodfall’s Ch-
ronicle for parliamentary reporting, given his reputation in that regard.145 
Much of the revised history thus depends on Woodfall’s accuracy. Did 
he in fact report Justice Nares correctly? It is difficult to know for certain 
because Nares’s personal papers no longer survive. Nevertheless, the 
weight of the evidence militates heavily against Woodfall, not for him. 
For one, there are other newspaper accounts that contradict the 
Chronicle. Nearly all are from papers in Scotland that seem to have used 
                                                                                                                          
139 ROSE, supra note 28, at 155; see also DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 199 & n.40. 
140 E.g., GENERAL EVENING POST (London), Feb. 19, 1774, at 1; MIDDLESEX JOURNAL (London), 
Feb. 19, 1774, at 1; WESTMINSTER JOURNAL (London), Feb. 19, 1774, at 3. 
141 E.g., IPSWICH JOURNAL, Feb. 19, 1774, at 2; JACKSON’S OXFORD JOURNAL, Feb. 19, 1774, at 
2; LEINSTER JOURNAL (Kilkenny), Mar. 5, 1774, at 1; MANCHESTER MERCURY, Feb. 22, 1774, at 4. 
142 Letter from J. Grove to J. Grimston (Feb. 22, 1774), ERY MS DDGR/42/31/XV. 
143 See generally Mary Ransome, The Reliability of Contemporary Reporting of Debates of the 
House of Commons, 1727–1741, 24 BULL. INST. HIST. RES. 67, 68–69 (1942); Will Slauter, A Trojan 
Horse in Parliament: International Publicity in the Age of the American Revolution, in INTO PRINT: 
LIMITS AND LEGACIES OF ENLIGHTENMENT 15, 21–23 (Charles Walton ed., 2011). 
144 We are fortunate to have specific evidence, taken from a prosecution brought against Woodfall 
for publishing a libelous letter in the same February 16 issue, that the paper was printed early that mor-
ning. Case, Att’y Gen. v. W. Woodfall, PRO TS11/24 (K.B. 1774). The Public Advertiser also appear-
ed on February 16, but that paper was published by Woodfall’s brother Henry Sampson Woodfall. 
PUBLIC ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 16, 1774, at 2. For reasons explained more fully below, see infra 
text accompanying notes 164–167, William may have been the source for the Public Advertiser. In any 
case, the report is so short that it is difficult to conclude that it supports the revisionist account. The 
Gazetteer also appeared on the 16th, but it reported only very briefly that Justice Nares had said copy-
right was a common-law right, which was technically true. GAZETTEER (London), Feb. 16, 1774, at 2. 
145 Thomas, supra note 66, at 627–28 (describing the extensive copying of Woodfall). A two-way 
street, Woodfall sometimes took to copying others. JAMES STEPHEN, THE MEMOIRS OF JAMES STEPHEN 
293–94 (Merle M. Bevington ed., 1954) (recalling Woodfall’s practices in the 1780s). 
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their own correspondents for some of their reports.146 Scottish booksellers 
had a particular interest in the case. The appellants, Alexander and John 
Donaldson, were Scots and, though they were working in London at the 
time of the dispute, they usually printed their books in Scotland and thus 
stood as proxies for its entire reprint industry. Quite simply, the Scottish 
trade had good reasons and means for obtaining its own news. 
Take, for example, the Caledonian Mercury. It reported on February 
19 that “though [Justice Nares] was inclined to think, that authors had a 
right at common-law; yet he was of opinion, that right was taken away by 
the statute of Queen Anne.”147 The Edinburgh Evening Courant was of the 
same view, noting that “Mr Justice Nares also gave his opinion for the 
appellants”148 and that as of February 17, “five of the Judges [had given] 
their opinions against the perpetual monopoly, viz. Mr Baron Eyre, Mr 
Justice Nares, Mr Baron Perrot, Mr Justice Gould, and Mr Baron 
Adams.”149 Last but not least, the Edinburgh Advertiser, which was 
published by James Donaldson, the son of the appellant Alexander 
Donaldson,150 reached the same conclusion and provided readers with the 
following summary: 
The Opinions of the JUDGES are, 
For the APPELLANTS, (for the  For the RESPONDENTS.  
limited monopoly in books.)   (For the perpetual monopoly in 
      books.) 
COURT of COMMON PLEAS. COURT of KING’S BENCH. 
1. Chief Justice DE GREY  1. Sir RICHARD ASTON. 
2. Sir HENRY GOULD.  2. EDWARD WILLES, Esq. 
3. Sir GEORGE NARES.  3. Sir W. H. ASHURST. 
COURT OF EXCHEQUER.  COURT of COMMON PLEAS. 
4. Sir RICHARD ADAMS.  4. Sir WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. 
5. GEORGE PERROT, Esq.  COURT of EXCHEQUER 
6. Sir JAMES EYRE.    5. Lord Chief Baron SMYTH.151 
It is possible, and in some instances provable, that a few Scottish papers 
relied on a compatriot paper.152 Even so, it appears we are left with two 
types of accounts: those based on Woodfall and those that are not. 
                                                                                                                          
146 For a London periodical that suggests Justice Nares was against a perpetual right, see 6 TOWN 
AND COUNTRY MAGAZINE 99 (London, A. Hamilton 1774) (Feb. issue). 
147 CALEDONIAN MERCURY (Edinburgh), Feb. 19, 1774, at 2; accord id. Feb. 23, 1774, at 2. 
148 EDINBURGH EVENING COURANT, Feb. 19, 1774, at 2. 
149 Id. Feb. 23, 1774, at 1. 
150 ROBERT T. SKINNER, A NOTABLE FAMILY OF SCOTS PRINTERS 1–8 (1927). 
151 EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, Feb. 25, 1774, at 124; accord id. Feb. 22, 1774, at 117; WEEKLY 
MAGAZINE (Edinburgh), Feb. 24, 1774, at 286. 
152 See Appendix infra. 
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The elephant in the room is the official record of the House of Lords. 
On the day that Justice Nares spoke, the Clerk Assistant Samuel Strutt,153 
or one of his deputies, noted in his minute book that Nares believed there 
was a common-law right but that the Statute of Anne preempted it: 
 Upon the Third Question deliver’d his Opinion, That such 
Action at Common Law is taken away by the Statute 8.th 
Anne and that an Author by the said Statute is precluded 
from every Remedy except on the Foundation of the said 
Statute and on the Terms and Conditions prescribed 
thereby.—And gave his Reasons. 
. . . . 
 Upon the fifth Question deliver’d his Opinion That this 
Right is impeached restrained and taken away by the Statute 
8.th Anne—And gave his Reasons.154 
This account was later moved to the manuscript journal without 
modification,155 and from there to the Burrow and Brown Reports. 
The exact manner in which these entries were generated is a mystery. 
Donaldson scholars have always assumed that the clerk was expected to 
divine the answers to the five questions that were asked of the eleven 
judges solely from the reasons offered by those judges in open court. But 
there are other possibilities. Given the number of questions posed, perhaps 
the judges, who had conferred twice beforehand, provided their answers in 
writing to the clerk and left only the opinions or reasons to be said in the 
House. Or perhaps each judge read his answers to the questions either 
before or after entering into his reasons for them. It is true that Woodfall 
did not systematically report the answers in his account, and thus one 
might argue that the answers had not been spoken aloud. But there would 
have been no need for him to do so, as he would have known that the clerk 
would memorialize the same in the minutes, as was customary. At the very 
least, it seems reasonable to presume that the clerk received some veri-
fication from the judges. The clerk knew his tally of the 55 answers would 
be relayed to and relied upon by the Lords. He thus may have shown his 
notes to the judges after each opinion or after all the opinions on a given 
day. Notably, the minutes do bear a few marks of correction for Justice 
Ashurst,156 though admittedly the source of the correction is unknown. 
                                                                                                                          
153 J.C. SAINTY, THE PARLIAMENT OFFICE IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES: 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON CLERKS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 1600 TO 1800, at 9, 22 (1977). 
154 MS Minutes of the House of Lords, PA HL/PO/JO/5/1/121 (Feb. 15, 1774). 
155 MS Journal of the House of Lords, PA HL/PO/JO/1/145, pp. 95–96 (Feb. 15, 1774). 
156 MS Minutes of the House of Lords, PA HL/PO/JO/5/1/121 (Feb. 15, 1774). 
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There is more evidence still that Woodfall was mistaken. First are the 
printed cases that were distributed to the Lords before the hearing, as 
required by House rules. Of the nine surviving copies I have reviewed, 
seven have manuscript annotations dated February 22, 1774, the day the 
House voted, confirming the orthodox 6-to-5 tally. The copy in the 
Parliamentary Archives states: “NB. Six of the Judges were ag:st the 
Perpetuity and Five for it.”157 Most of these are probably leftover cases 
marked and sold by the Door-Keepers—a common practice.158 
The most compelling evidence stems from proceedings taken a few 
months after Donaldson on a bill in the House of Commons to protect 
certain works for an additional 14 years. In that context, the orthodox count 
was again confirmed, this time by other persons we would expect to be 
well informed of the appeal. In support of the bill, counsel for the 
booksellers of London, James Mansfield (no relation to Lord Mansfield), 
stated that only “five of the judges, when giving their opinion in the House 
of Lords,” believed that copyright was perpetual.159 This report of 
Mansfield’s views, which also comes from Woodfall’s newspaper, is 
confirmed by Henry Cavendish, a member of the Commons who regularly 
took notes of the debates in that House. He wrote that Mansfield had said: 
[F]ive Judges thought clearly in favour of the right; & of 
those who disputed it, two thought it had existence at 
Common-law, but that the Statute of Queen Anne had 
abrogated it. [S]o that there were seven who decided in 
favour of it as an original right inherent in the author . . . .160 
Alexander Wedderburn, one of the barristers who argued for the 
London booksellers in Donaldson, was of the same view.161 So was the 
written case that was submitted to Parliament in support of the bill.162 And 
the opposition characterized the tally the same way. Arthur Murphy, who 
represented the Donaldsons in their appeal and in opposing the bill, wrote: 
“[I]n the House of Lords six of the Judges were decisively of Opinion, that 
                                                                                                                          
157 THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS iiiv (s.l.n. 1774), PA HL/PO/JU/4/3/18; accord THE CASE OF 
THE RESPONDENTS iiir–v (s.l.n. 1774), BL 1483.dd.1(73); THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS iiir–v (s.l.n. 
1774), BL L.3.a.1[vol. 17](132); THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS iiiv (s.l.n. 1774), SL Session Papers 
F31:6; THE CASE OF THE APPELLANTS 9v (s.l.n. 1774), AL House of Lords Papers, Appeal Cases, 
1772–1774; THE CASE OF THE APPELLANTS 9v (s.l.n. 1774), KI Petitions v.41[6]; THE CASE OF THE 
APPELLANTS 9v (s.l.n. 1774), OHL KF 223 G741, set 1, v. 2, p. 156. 
158 Cf. THOMAS OSBORNE, ADVERTISEMENT 1 (s.l.n. [c.1758]), Bodl. J.J. Book Trade Docs. No. 
25 (advertising printed cases previously purchased from the estate of a Door-Keeper). 
159 MORNING CHRONICLE (London), May 16, 1774, at 4. 
160 Henry Cavendish, Debates in the Commons, BL Egerton MS 259, pp. 35–36 (May 13, 1774). 
161 MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Mar. 26, 1774, at 2. 
162 THE CASE OF THE BOOKSELLERS OF LONDON AND WESTMINSTER 2 (s.l.n. [1774]), Bodl. Carte 
MS 207, No. 6, Bodl. Vet. 2581.c.5(3). 
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the Decree against Donaldson ought to be reversed.”163 It would be quite 
remarkable (and unlikely) for the clerk in the House of Lords and counsel 
on both sides to be mistaken on this point. Rather, this appears to be one of 
those many instances where a journalist has misreported legal proceedings. 
So how could Woodfall have made this error? It is true that he was 
blessed with awe-inspiring powers of recall, leading to the sobriquet 
“memory Woodfall,”164 but he was not infallible. For one, Woodfall heard 
four opinions on the day that Justice Nares spoke, spanning the course of 
about two hours, and he could not write down a single word until he 
returned to his establishment.165 The clerk, on the other hand, could write 
as much as he pleased. Compounding matters, Woodfall likely had other 
things on his mind that day. His brother Henry, the publisher of the Public 
Advertiser, had been arrested by the House of Commons the evening 
before Justice Nares spoke (and remained in custody until March 2).166 His 
offense was publishing a letter that criticized the Speaker of the Commons. 
According to Henry, this confinement seriously disrupted his business,167 a 
business that William probably would have had to help shore up. 
 
* * * 
In sum, I must respectfully disagree with the conclusions of my 
colleagues that the clerk misreported Justice Nares, and that the House of 
Lords rejected a recommendation of the judges to affirm and instead 
adopted the advice of the speaking Lords to reverse. In fact, it appears that 
both majorities agreed the House should reverse, albeit not on the very 
same grounds. 
2.  The House of Lords 
As for the reasoning of the House, this is an area where I again part 
ways with Abrams and Deazley (but concur with Whicher and Rose).168 
                                                                                                                          
163 [ARTHUR MURPHY], OBSERVATIONS ON THE CASE OF THE BOOKSELLERS OF LONDON AND 
WESTMINSTER 2 (s.l.n. [1774]), BL 215.i.4(99); see also CALEDONIAN MERCURY (Edinburgh), Mar. 
21, 1774, at 1 (attributing authorship of the Observations pamphlet to Arthur Murphy). 
164 NIKKI HESSELL, LITERARY AUTHORS, PARLIAMENTARY REPORTERS 64 (2012). 
165 See MACDONAGH, supra note 68, at 268–69, 281, 287; accord MORNING CHRONICLE 
(London), Feb. 14, 1774, at 2 (publishing a letter from a reader remarking on Woodfall’s practices). 
166 34 H.C. JOUR. 456, 526–27 (Feb. 14 & Mar. 2, 1774); PUBLIC ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 16, 
1774, at 2. 
167 34 H.C. JOUR. 526–27 (Mar. 2, 1774). In an affidavit in an unrelated case, Henry later recalled 
that “on Tuesday the 15.th day of Febry . . . being the first Day and a very few hours after this Dep.t was 
taken into Custody as afores.d he was in so much hurry and Confusion from the great number of 
persons who came to see him [in custody] and the situation he was then in, that [he] did not and could 
not possibly attend to any Business.” Affidavit of Henry Sampson Woodfall, Nov. 15, 1774, Att’y Gen. 
v. H.S. Woodfall, PRO TS11/24 (K.B. 1774). 
168 For other scholars agreeing with Rose that the reasoning is opaque, see ALEXANDER, supra 
note 28, at 37–38; 5 DAVID M. WALKER, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SCOTLAND 770 (1998); W.R. Cornish, 
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Discerning the grounds of an appeal decided in 1774 was, and remains, a 
pragmatic exercise that sometimes results in frustration for lawyers and 
judges. One has to determine the views of a court that permitted all of its 
members to vote on appeals, ruled without articulating reasons of the 
House, and restricted the publication of its own proceedings. 
The most certain way to ascertain a decision’s reasoning is to consult 
the judgment,169 but judgments are rarely so transparent. Sometimes other 
direct evidence exists of the grounds the whole House relied upon.170 But 
as this is not often the case, one must typically apply various means of 
deduction. An affirmance might suggest, for example, that the House 
rejected all of the dispositive grounds the appellant advanced in his printed 
case. A rationale might also be plain in cases of reversal or variance if 
there was only one possible ground for doing so. And, of course, a 
consistent opinion of the judges and speaking Lords offers some insight. 
Unfortunately, none of these circumstances is present in Donaldson. 
The House reversed on one or more of three possible grounds: authors held 
no common-law rights; their rights were lost upon publication; or their 
rights were preempted. The opinions of the judges also differed in many 
respects from the speaking Lords. Making matters worse, 84 Lords 
attended on the day of judgment and each was entitled to vote or not as he 
pleased and to do so on whatever grounds he saw fit. Lysander Spooner 
described the difficulties in 1855: “How many of those lords, who voted 
for the reversal, did so in the belief that there was no copyright at common 
law; and how many did so in the belief that the common law copyright had 
been taken away by the statute, does not appear.”171 For all we know, the 
Lords adopted the suggestion of the Bishop of Carlisle to limit their 
thinking and deliberation to the issue of preemption. This problem is not 
unique to Donaldson. Bill Cornish recently observed that “[s]o long as the 
House of Lords acted as an ultimate authority in the settlement of disputes 
by voting rather than by articulating reasons for judgment, it was difficult 
to treat its decisions as settling legal rules in a general sense.”172 
Abrams and Deazley argue that the matter is not as complicated as it 
has been made out to be, and that we can and indeed must adopt the 
                                                                                                                          
The Author’s Surrogate: The Genesis of British Copyright, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL HISTORY 
254, 262 (Katherine O’Donovan & Gerry R. Rubin eds., 2000); Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 651. 
169 E.g., Dowager of Marlborough v. Strong, 22 H.L. JOUR. 270 (H.L. 1723/4); Barnardiston v. 
Rex, 14 H.L. JOUR. 210 (H.L. 1689). 
170 E.g., MacCullock v. MacCullock, 2 Pat. App. 33, 36 (H.L. 1759); Gordon v. His Majesty’s 
Advocate, 1 Pat. App. 558, 567 (H.L. 1754). 
171 LYSANDER SPOONER, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 212 (Boston, B. Marsh 1855). 
172 11 WILLIAM CORNISH ET AL., THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 48 (2010); 
accord CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 220–21 (7th ed. 1964); EDWARD SUGDEN, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY AS ADMINISTERED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 39–42 (London, S. 
Sweet 1849); see also Cornish, supra note 168, at 261–62 (applying the same concern to Donaldson). 
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speeches of the Lords as the holding in Donaldson. Both scholars state that 
“while ‘the judicial [opinions] were only advisory,’ ‘the Lords’ statements 
were the law of the case.’”173 Neither explains precisely what is meant by 
this statement, but given the contexts in which it was made and the 
conclusions that are drawn, they appear to argue that certain rules or 
doctrines at the time dictated that the speeches of the Lords, when made on 
the winning side, constituted the reasons of the House. Stated another way, 
the speaking Lords decided the case, not the House as a whole, and, 
consequently, we must disregard the advice offered by the judges and the 
fact that many other Lords potentially voted on the appeal. 
I believe this to be incorrect for a number of reasons. First and 
foremost, it is difficult in this context to consider the speaking Lords (even 
the law Lords) as any different from the judges given that the speeches 
were just as advisory as the opinions. Lords were free to side against the 
speakers,174 and lay Lords could even cause the House to rule against the 
wishes of the law Lords, something that happened in years on either side of 
Donaldson.175 As Edward Sugden noted many years later: 
[T]he Lords are entitled to require the Judges to give them 
their opinions, which opinions are to instruct and guide them, 
although they are not binding on them. . . . Now the law 
Lords can both advise the House and vote in favour of their 
own views; but their opinions are no more binding on the 
House than the opinions of the learned Judges.176 
The time at which the speeches were made also bears this out. The 
Lords spoke before the vote, not after, because the speeches served to ex-
plain why a Lord planned to vote a particular way and to urge his 
colleagues to do the same. Indeed, speakers would not necessarily know 
whether they would end up in the majority. Although the law Lords might 
confer among themselves before their speeches, they would not formally 
confer with the whole House beforehand. It thus seems hard to imagine 
that the speaking Lords always expected their speeches to represent the 
                                                                                                                          
173 DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 217 (quoting Abrams, supra note 5, at 1169); see also id. at 210. 
174 E.g., Douglas v. Hamilton (H.L. 1769), in 2 COLLECTANEA JURIDICA 386, 404 ([Francis 
Hargrave] ed., London, E. & R. Brooke 1792). 
175 E.g., Hill v. St. John, 7 Bro. P.C. 353, 368, cit. 2 W. Black 933 (H.L. 1775) (noting that the 
House had affirmed even though Lords Apsley and Camden had urged it to reverse); Pomfret v. Smith, 
6 Bro. P.C. 434 (H.L. 1771); LONDON EVENING-POST, Mar. 9, 1771, at 4 (noting that the House had 
reversed and ordered a new trial in Pomfret against the advice of Lords Apsley and Camden). 
176 SUGDEN, supra note 172, at 32. Sugden wrote these words at a time when the law Lords 
decided appeals without the rest of the House. And because the law Lords were in all but name the 
actual court of appeal, their views were no longer merely advisory. Nostalgic, he lamented this fact 
because it meant that a few law Lords could trump the views of the bulk of the judges. Id. at 26–33. 
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views of those on their side, let alone the judgment of the House,177 parti-
cularly when the case was contentious and drew the opinions of the judges. 
Additionally, if the speeches were thought to be paramount, one would 
have expected House procedures to not hinder their dissemination. And yet 
the opposite was true. Members of the public were not permitted to take 
notes of the speeches,178 and no one was allowed to publish them. To be 
sure, speeches were sometimes published, perhaps even with the help of a 
Lord, but this occurred in a haphazard way and not in observance of an 
expressed rule that the speech would constitute the reasons of the whole 
House. In any case, apart from some slips, the prohibitions were very 
successful. At the time of Donaldson, there had been only one published 
collection of appeals and writs of error in the House of Lords.179 As I 
previously noted, the House reprimanded the publisher.180 This was done 
even though he omitted (with one exception) the speeches of the Lords. 
Thereafter, no new collection of parliamentary cases was published, 
whether authorized or not, until Josiah Brown gave us the first book of his 
multi-volume series in 1779.181 With a few exceptions, he too omitted the 
speeches of the Lords. The next sets of parliamentary reports in 1789, 
1803, and 1807 operated under similar conventions.182 Indeed, it was not 
until 1814 that reports regularly included the speeches of the Lords.183 
Remarkably, apart from the judgments, the only thing the Lords’ journal 
thought worthy of reporting publicly were the answers of the judges.184 
With respect to cases decided in 1774, the most that can be said is that 
because the House usually ruled as the law Lords advised—be it to affirm, 
reverse, or vary—we should presume that the House also followed the 
                                                                                                                          
177 Accord CHARLES MARSH DENISON & CHARLES HENDERSON SCOTT, THE PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS 116–17 (London, Butterworths 1879). 
178 Cf. 1 BOSWELL, supra note 57, at 377 (indicating in 1772 that counsel on appeals were 
permitted to take notes); accord BOSWELL FOR THE DEFENCE, supra note 57, at 116, 180. 
179 [BARTHOLOMEW SHOWER], CASES IN PARLIAMENT (London, A. & J. Churchill 1698). On the 
reporting of parliamentary cases as part of reports of other courts, see the correspondence between 
Lord Hardwicke and Justice Foster of the King’s Bench in MICHAEL DODSON, THE LIFE OF SIR MI-
CHAEL FOSTER, KNT. 45–49 (London, J. Johnson & Co. 1811) (Feb. 2, 1761, Mar. 30 & Apr. 2, 1762). 
180 See supra text accompanying note 64. 
181 1 JOSIAH BROWN, REPORTS OF CASES UPON APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR (London, 
Majesty’s Law-Printers 1779). 
182 RICHARD COLLES, REPORTS OF CASES UPON APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR (Dublin, E. 
Lynch 1789); 1 JOSIAH BROWN & T.E. TOMLINS, REPORTS OF CASES UPON APPEALS AND WRITS OF 
ERROR (London, A. Strahan 2d ed. 1803); 1 DAVID ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF CASES ON APPEAL FROM 
SCOTLAND, DECIDED IN THE HOUSE OF PEERS (London, A. Strahan 1807). 
183 1 PATRICK DOW, REPORTS OF CASES UPON APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR IN THE HOUSE OF 
LORDS (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1814); see also 1 JOHN CRAIGIE ET AL., REPORTS OF CASES 
DECIDED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, UPON APPEAL FROM SCOTLAND (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1849). 
184 In later years, the journal also regularly reported the opinions of the judges. E.g., Croft v. 
Lumley, 90 H.L. JOUR. 32–43 (H.L. 1858); Scott v. Avery, 88 H.L. JOUR. 165–71 (H.L. 1856); Jefferys 
v. Boosey, 86 H.L. JOUR. 299–322 (H.L. 1854); Gosling v. Veley, 84 H.L. JOUR. 324–40 (H.L. 1852). 
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reasoning of the law Lords as expressed in their speeches. Law Lords, as 
contrasted with lay Lords, merited special reverence due to their legal 
training and experience. But this presumption, if one can call it that, seems 
most helpful in instances where the Lords heard an appeal or writ of error 
without the assistance of the judges.185 This follows because in cases like 
Donaldson, where the judges were summoned, we encounter a like 
presumption that the House usually followed the judges. About 100 years 
prior to Donaldson, Chief Justice Hale wrote the following: 
[S]ince the time that the whole decision of errors have been 
practised in the house of lords by their votes, the judges have 
been always consulted withal, and their opinion held so 
sacred, that the lords have ever conformed their judgments 
thereunto, unless in cases where all the judges were parties to 
the former judgment, as in the case of ship money.[186] . . . 
[T]hough for many years last past they have had only voices 
of advice and assistance not authoritative or decisive; yet 
their opinions have been always the rules, whereby the lords 
do or should proceed in matters of law . . . .187 
The records of the mid-to-late 18th century indicate that this largely 
remained true. There are very few instances where the House defied the 
judges. From 1730 to 1800, inclusive, the judges offered advice in 83 
appeals and writs of error. But in only four do the records show the House 
voting in a manner inconsistent with the views of the judges; and in three 
of those cases the vote also went against the majority of the law Lords.188 
Presumptions can fall away, of course, such as where the judges advise 
the House to affirm, but the law Lords urge it to reverse. In such a case, if 
the House reverses, one would be hard pressed to argue that the House 
followed the reasoning of the majority of the judges. It is thus easy to un-
                                                                                                                          
185 E.g., Arthur v. Arthur, 21 H.L. JOUR. 280, 2 Bro. P.C. 143 (H.L. 1720); see also Anita Jane 
Rees, The Practice and Procedure of the House of Lords 1714–1784, at 157 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. 
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187 MATTHEW HALE, THE JURISDICTION OF THE LORDS HOUSE 158–59 (London, T. Cadell Jr. & 
W. Davies 1796) (written c.1669). 
188 Bishop of London v. Ffytche, 36 H.L. JOUR. 683–85, 687, 2 Bro. P.C. (2d ed.) 211, 217–19 
(H.L. 1783); PUBLIC ADVERTISER (London), June 6, 1783, at 3 (division list in Ffytche); Hill v. St. 
John, 34 H.L. JOUR. 443, 7 Bro. P.C. 353, 368 (H.L. 1775); Archbishop of Armagh v. King, 23 H.L. 
JOUR. 545, 1 Barn. K.B. 329, 329, cit. 2 Strange 837, 843 (H.L. 1730); see also Foley v. Burnell, 37 
H.L. JOUR. 248–49, 4 Bro P.C. (2d ed.) 319, 328 (H.L. 1785) (voting against the judges only). 
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derstand why one might believe that the speeches of the Lords in Donald-
son constituted the law of the case; it has been increasingly thought over 
the last fifty years that Donaldson fell into this category. But as I have 
already argued, and I hope demonstrated, Donaldson is not one of those 
cases. Rather, we have a majority of the judges and a majority of the law 
(and lay) Lords advising the House to reverse, which is what it then did. 
The manner in which appeals were heard eventually changed in such a 
way as to support the rule advanced by Abrams and Deazley, but not for 
many years. In 1823, toward the end of Lord Eldon’s tenure, it became 
usual for the law Lords to decide appeals without the rest of the House. A 
few lay peers would attend to reach the required quorum of three, but they 
typically would not vote.189 By the late 1830s, the House counted seven 
law Lords among its members, and their numbers were often enough to sit 
without the need of lay peers.190 Thus, in 1839, James Stewart wrote that 
“it is not now the practice of the whole body of the house to attend to its 
judicial business. This is usually transacted entirely by the lord chancellor, 
speakers, or other peers, who have at one time filled judicial situations.”191 
Even still, it was not until 1844 that the convention was established that lay 
Lords should never vote on appellate matters.192 It was only with these 
changes, combined with proper reporting, that one could expect that the 
Lords who spoke were the ones who decided the appeal and that their 
words reflected the reasoning of the House. Stated elsewise, the speeches 
were no longer advisory, but became more akin to judgments of a court.193 
Something also must be said of the authorities cited by Abrams and 
Deazley. Abrams cites only one source to support his principal thesis—that 
in 1774 the speeches of the Lords constituted the holding of the case—but 
it is unsupportive and otherwise inapposite because it speaks of a time 
when appellate practices in the House of Lords differed greatly.194 Deazley 
largely relies on Abrams, but he does go further and discusses evidence 
                                                                                                                          
189 C.P. COOPER, A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROCEEDINGS IN 
PARLIAMENT 409 (London, J. Murray 1828); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF 
LORDS AS A JUDICIAL BODY, 1800–1976, at 19–22 (1978); see also STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE 
OF LORDS 135–36 (s.l.n. 1825) (July 7, 1823) (requiring three Lords to attend appeals by rota). 
190 STEVENS, supra note 189, at 29–40. 
191 JAMES STEWART, THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS 9 (London, E. Spettigue 1839) (contrasting with 
the method that existed at the time Justice Blackstone published his Commentaries in the 1760s). 
192 STEVENS, supra note 189, at 29–34; accord 11 CORNISH ET AL., supra note 172, at 528–37. 
193 Accord TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 1844, at 4 (noting that the custom that “prevents any but law 
Lords [from] voting” makes the “decision of certain law Lords” the decision of the House); 60 
EDINBURGH REVIEW, OR CRITICAL JOURNAL 24–25 (Edinburgh, Longman et al. 1835) (“[T]he 
judgment of the Lords, though technically and formally that of the whole House, is practically and 
substantially nothing more than the judgment of the Lord Chancellor; or of the Lord Chancellor and 
other law lords who have been raised to the peerage.”). 
194 Abrams, supra note 5, at 1169, 1160 n.175 (citing 10 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 609–11 (1938) (citing Palgrave, Brown & Son v. S.S. Turid, [1922] 1 A.C. 397, 413)). 
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that requires our attention. As proof of the supremacy of the speeches, 
Deazley cites a portion of the proceedings taken in Parliament in 1774 to 
protect certain works for an additional 14 years.195 Six days after the 
decision in Donaldson, a group of aggrieved booksellers petitioned for a 
bill, stating that 
by a late Decision of the House of Peers, such Common Law 
Right of Authors and their Assigns hath been declared to 
have no Existence, whereby the Petitioners will be very great 
Sufferers, through their involuntary Misapprehension of the 
Law.196 
The preamble of the bill similarly stated that “it hath lately been adjudged 
in the House of Lords that no such copy right in authors or their assigns 
doth exist at common law.”197 From these statements, my friend concludes 
that “it is clear that the decision of the peers was initially understood to 
have dismissed any notion of a common law right,” and that the “book-
sellers themselves [concluded that] the House of Lords had denied that any 
common law copyright predated the Statute of Anne; the legislation had in 
fact created a new, temporally limited, property right in literary works.”198 
Deazley’s interpretation of this language is certainly sensible. In fact, 
he was not the first to read it that way. Alexander Donaldson seized on the 
very same language in petitioning against the bill in the House of Lords.199 
As others who opposed the bill were wont to do,200 Donaldson pressed the 
same arguments that he made during the appeal—including that there was 
no antecedent right—and he declared that the House of Lords had reached 
the same conclusion. As Paul Feilde, who supported the booksellers’ bill, 
aptly (and perhaps cynically) noted at the time: “[E]very body that sup-
ports the decision of the H of L says that at the time of making the Statute 
of Queen Anne, no such thing existed as Copyright at Common Law.”201 
Nevertheless, another interpretation of the petition and bill is plausible. 
By stating that the common-law right has “no Existence” or “doth [not] 
exist,” the petitioners, who cared most about whether they retained perpe-
tual copyrights after the statute, could very well have meant that the com-
mon-law right does not now exist rather than that the right never existed. 
                                                                                                                          
195 DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 213–18. 
196 34 H.C. JOUR. 513 (Feb. 28, 1774). 
197 An Act for Relief of Booksellers and Others, PA HL/PO/JO/10/2/53 (1774). The bill was also 
printed. AN ACT FOR RELIEF OF BOOKSELLERS AND OTHERS (s.l.n. 1774). 
198 DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 217, 218. 
199 COPY OF ALEXANDER DONALDSON’S PETITION TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS, AGAINST THE 
LONDON BOOKSELLERS BILL 2 (s.l.n. 1774), HSP AB-[1774]-29. 
200 E.g., Diary of Jacob Pleydell-Bouverie, WSA 1946/4/2F/1/3 (May 16, 1774); Cavendish, 
supra note 160, at 90 (May 16, 1774) (Pleydell-Bouverie). 
201 Cavendish, supra note 160, at 119 (May 16, 1774). 
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The thrust of their written case was that they legitimately believed they 
held common-law rights that survived the Statute of Anne.202 As a 
consequence, they had purchased copyrights that were outside the statutory 
terms and some within but at prices that presumed the rights were 
perpetual. To take the perpetual right away so swiftly would constitute an 
extreme hardship. Insisting their belief was genuine, the petitioners cited 
the savings clause of the Statute of Anne and said it had led them to 
conceive “that the Act did not affect or take away the Common Law Right 
supposed to be vested in the Authors of Books, and their Assigns, in Per-
petuity.”203 Their position was also confirmed, they noted, by the King’s 
Bench in Millar. Turning next to Donaldson, they observed that the House 
of Lords had declared the “before supposed Common Law Copy Right in 
Books,” meaning a common-law right that persisted after the statute, “to 
have no Existence.”204 The petitioners stressed that their misapprehension 
was the more excusable because the judges in Donaldson nearly supported 
a “Common Law Copy Right . . . in Perpetuity.”205 A majority of the 
judges had opined that a common-law right existed before the statute and 
“many of them” declared the statute did not abridge the right.206 Notably, a 
similar description of the “common law right” is given in the petition and 
the preamble of the bill, both of which also refer to “such” right.207 
Stated another way, the phrases “common law right” or “copy right” 
were sometimes used as a shorthand for the idea of a perpetual copyright 
that survived and subsisted alongside the statute.208 This was how William 
Woodfall used the term when he reported the arguments of James 
Mansfield, one of the counsel who argued for the bill on behalf of the 
petitioners. And if we are to countenance the accuracy of Woodfall, then it 
appears that Mansfield himself sometimes used the words in this manner: 
It has been strongly contested . . . that the petitioners were 
not at all mistaken respecting the non-existence of a common 
law right . . . . Sir, . . . it is evident that they did misconceive, 
and I do not wonder at it, when I recollect that the highest 
court of law in Westminster Hall [the Court of King’s Bench] 
                                                                                                                          
202 CASE OF THE BOOKSELLERS, supra note 162, at 1–2. 
203 Id. at 1. 
204 Id. at 2. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. In response to this point, Arthur Murphy observed that the issue was not as close as 
imagined: “[I]n the House of Lords six of the Judges were decisively of Opinion, that the Decree 
against Donaldson ought to be reversed : To those six may be added the authority of the late Sir JOSEPH 
YATES, Lord CAMDEN, and the Lord HIGH CHANCELLOR.” MURPHY, supra note 163, at 2. 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 196–197. 
208 E.g., Donaldson v. Becket, 7 Bro. P.C. 88, 110 (H.L. 1774) (Josiah Brown) (using the terms 
synonymously: “[Five of the judges were] in favour of the perpetuity, or common law right; and the 
other six . . . were of opinion against it . . . .”). 
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equally misconceived it, and that five of the judges, when 
giving their opinion in the House of Lords, immediately 
previous to the late determination[,] were also of the same 
sentiments . . . .209 
The judges referred to, of course, were the five who thought that copyright 
was perpetual despite the Statute of Anne, and not the seven who believed 
in an original right inherent in the author. 
Woodfall also reported Alexander Wedderburn as using the phrase 
“Common-Law Right” similarly. Wedderburn had been appointed to draft 
the bill submitted to the Commons and had spoken on behalf of the 
petitioners.210 According to Woodfall, Wedderburn stated: 
Three out of four Judges [in Millar]. . . had fully . . . 
convinced not only the booksellers, but at least half the 
public, that a Common-Law Right did exist; and even in the 
late decision [in Donaldson], the opinion of the great 
luminary of the law [Lord Mansfield], was supported nearly 
by half the number of Judges [i.e., by five of the judges].211 
Notably, Wedderburn also purportedly described Donaldson as a “determi-
nation that there was no common-law right for a perpetuity . . . .”212 
In short, the documents that Deazley cites—the petition and the pre-
amble to the bill—are ambiguous. It is unfortunate the petitioners were not 
more precise. Perhaps they did not perceive a need to be; they may have 
believed the reasoning was obvious to all concerned. But another possibil-
ity is that their imprecision came about by necessity. Although they un-
doubtedly understood that the House had rejected perpetual copyrights, the 
petitioners may not have known the exact reasons underlying the decision 
because of the single question posed to the Lords and the manner of voting. 
3.  Perceptions Redux 
Although I doubt that the petitioners used the aforementioned words in 
the manner Deazley contends, he certainly is correct that some persons 
interpreted Donaldson as having rejected some type of antecedent right. 
Apart from the sources already noted, there were others, though many of 
them occurred in the course of advocacy. Advocates and judges in 
                                                                                                                          
209 MORNING CHRONICLE (London), May 16, 1774, at 4 (emphasis added); see also Cavendish, 
supra note 160, at 35 (May 13, 1774). 
210 34 H.C. JOUR. 590 (Mar. 24, 1774). 
211 MORNING CHRONICLE (London), March 26, 1774, at 2 (emphasis added). 
212 Id. 
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Scotland were particularly keen to adopt this reading of Donaldson,213 
which is no surprise given that the Court of Session had twice rejected a 
common-law right in published works before Donaldson.214 Even there, 
some variety appeared. In one case, for example, the Solicitor General of 
Scotland argued on a common-law right in unpublished works stemming 
from an author’s own labor.215 And in another case, one of the Lords of 
Session stated that “[t]here is a literary property at common law.”216 
In England, the perception of Donaldson was decidedly different from 
that in Scotland. Nearly all the judges who opined on the matter adopted 
the second or third reading of Donaldson. That is to say, they recognized 
that the House had rejected perpetual copyright, but they then relied on the 
answers of the judges in Donaldson, the views of the jurists in Millar, and 
sometimes their own views in assessing whether an antecedent right 
existed.217 Deazley argues that the judges taking this approach fundamen-
tally misunderstood Donaldson. He labels the phenomenon the “emergence 
and rise of . . . the cult of Millar and the re-branding of Donaldson.”218 
Two decisions in particular deserve our attention because Deazley 
identifies the first as principally responsible for causing subsequent 
misconstructions of Donaldson, and the second as perpetuating the error.219 
In the first case, Beckford v. Hood,220 the principal issue was whether 
copyright holders of published works were limited to the penalties con-
tained in the Statute of Anne or if they could pursue ordinary damages at 
common law. Counsel for the plaintiff acknowledged that after Donaldson 
an author could not, “after publication of his work, set up a common law 
right” and that therefore it might appear that the common-law remedy was 
unavailable.221 Counsel suggested, however, that the judges in Donaldson 
                                                                                                                          
213 Cadell v. Robertson, 19–20 Mor. Dec. Lit. Prop. Appx 16, 18–19 (Sess. 1804); Dodsley v. 
M’Farquhar, 19–20 Mor. Dec. Lit. Prop. Appx 1, 3 (Sess. 1775). 
214 Hinton v. Donaldson, 1 Hailes 535, cit. 5 Pat. App. 505, 5 Brown’s Supp. 508 (Sess. 1773); 
Midwinter v. Hamilton, 2 Kames Rem. Dec. 154, Kilk. 96 (Sess. 1748); see also generally Hector L. 
MacQueen, The War of the Booksellers: Natural Law, Equity, and Literary Property in Eighteenth-
Century Scotland, 35 J. LEGAL HIST. 231 (2014). 
215 Cadell v. Stewart, 19–20 Mor. Dec. Lit. Prop. Appx 13, 13–14 (Sess. 1804); see also 
INFORMATION FOR MESS. CADELL AND DAVIES 5–9 ([Edinburgh], D. Schaw & Son Sept. 30, 1803), SL 
Session Papers 458:15. 
216 Cadell v. Robertson, cit. 5 Pat. App. 498, 498–500 n.* (Sess. 1804) (Lord Hermand). 
217 DEAZLEY, supra note 115, at 26–55. One possible exception is Lord Eldon. On appeal from 
one of the Scottish cases mentioned previously, he stated that Donaldson had “declared that there was 
no right of property at common law.” Cadell v. Robertson, 5 Pat. App. 498, 502 (H.L. 1811). 
218 DEAZLEY, supra note 115, at 53. 
219 Id. at 29–32, 53; Ronan Deazley, The Life of an Author: Samuel Egerton Brydges and the 
Copyright Act 1814, 23 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 809, 813–16 (2006). 
220 7 T.R. 620 (K.B. 1798). 
221 Id. at 622. Importantly, of the six judges in Donaldson who opined that the statute preempted 
any preexisting common-law right, five also answered that the statute precluded authors from pursuing 
“every Remedy except on the Foundation of the said Statute, and on the Terms and Conditions 
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had not really concerned themselves with the “specific remed[ies]” 
available for infringement because they were principally focused on 
whether the “right of property [was] confined to that given . . . by the 
statute.”222 Turning next to the statute, he proceeded on the idea that the 
legislature had created a statutory right in published works but that the 
penalties and forfeitures were inadequate to vindicate that right. He thus 
urged the court to import ordinary damages from the common law.223  
The King’s Bench, which still counted Justice Ashurst among its 
members, unanimously held that the common-law remedy was available. 
The court ruled without having to ascertain the underlying reasoning of 
Donaldson. Referring to the decision, Justice Ashurst stated that the 
“question in the present case is much narrowed.”224 Nevertheless, two of 
the judges did characterize Donaldson, and both took a narrow view of its 
holding. Justice Grose stated that Donaldson established only that the 
“common law right of action . . . could not be exercised beyond the time 
limited by th[e] statute.”225 And the Chief Justice, Lord Kenyon, also 
thought that Donaldson had not rejected a common-law right ab initio. As 
a previously unremarked account of his opinion notes: 
 Lord KENYON said . . . [n]othing was more clear than at 
Common Law, the author of injured civiliter was entitled to 
his action . . . . With respect to the decision of the Twelve 
Judges, six against five in the case alluded to, of Donaldson 
against Becket, he would abstain from going into any 
discussion of the grounds of it. All that was necessary to state 
now was, that the law had been established; and some of the 
rights of the author at Common Law were taken away by the 
subsequent statutes.226 
The second case, Jefferys v. Boosey,227 is perhaps the most instructive 
because it ended up in the House of Lords in 1854 and provides, at its two 
                                                                                                                          
prescribed thereby.” 34 H.L. JOUR. 24 (Feb. 15, 1774); see also id. at 27–28, 30 (Feb. 17 & 21, 1774). 
The sixth judge, Baron Eyre, stated that equitable remedies would additionally be available for 
violations of the statute, but he did not mention ordinary damages. Id. at 24 (Feb. 15, 1774). 
222 Beckford, 7 T.R. at 626. 
223 Id. at 622–24. 
224 Id. at 628. 
225 Id. at 629; accord Beckford v. Hood, LI Dampier MS L.P.B. 222 (K.B. 1798) (Grose, J.) (“The 
opinions of the \6/ Judges in Dom. Proc. must be \understood to be/ that after the 14 years or 28 years 
there is no remedy at Com[mon] Law[.]”). 
226 Beckford v. Hood (K.B. 1798), in ORACLE AND PUBLIC ADVERTISER (London), May 12, 1798, 
at 3. Remarkably, it appears that defense counsel may have been of the same view. He stated that “the 
Statutes[,] which had been made upon the subject, had taken away the rights which were vested in 
authors by the Common Law.” Beckford v. Hood (K.B. 1798), in LONDON CHRONICLE, May 12, 1798, 
at 3. On the reliability of newspaper reports of courts other than the House of Lords, see James 
Oldham, Law Reporting in the London Newspapers, 1756–1786, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 177 (1987). 
227 4 H.L.C. 815 (H.L. 1854). 
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principal stages, the views of numerous judges and law Lords on the 
proper interpretation of Donaldson. At issue was whether a musical 
composition written by a foreigner in Milan, and published in England 
while the author still resided in Milan, was eligible for statutory protection 
under the Copyright Act of 1842.228 The trial judge said no.229 On appeal to 
the Exchequer Chamber, attended ad hoc by the justices of the Queen’s 
Bench and Common Pleas, the plaintiff offered the common law as an 
alternative.230 The lawyers on each side spun Donaldson in the way that 
suited them best.231 The court opted to rule on statutory grounds and held 
that the statute protected foreign works. It went on to state, however, that 
“we are strongly inclined to agree with Lord Mansfield and the great 
majority of the Judges, who, in Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson v. Becket, 
declared themselves to be in favour of the common-law right of 
authors.”232 Importantly, the seven justices in the Exchequer Chamber did 
not treat the issue as having been decided by the House in Donaldson.233 
The case eventually made its way to the House of Lords, which 
reinstated the original judgment.234 The issue of common-law rights was 
again discussed by counsel, the judges who were summoned for their ad-
vice, and the law Lords. Many of the judges avoided the issue outright, and 
of those that did not, some inclined to the right and others against it. Nearly 
all of them relied on the views of the judges in Donaldson and sometimes 
those in Millar and other cases.235 But never once did the judges or law 
Lords in Jefferys state that the House in Donaldson had decided the issue. 
On the contrary, they read the holding narrowly, as Justice Blackstone had 
in 1775, and they simply used the answers and opinions as guidance. 
Justice Erle of the Court of Queen’s Bench, for example, noted that “[t]his 
House decided in [Donaldson] that the statute had restricted the right to the 
terms of years therein mentioned, but it left the question of copyright at 
common law undecided.”236 And Lord Brougham, one of the law Lords 
who was against the right, stated that “upon the general question of literary 
                                                                                                                          
228 An Act to Amend the Law of Copyright, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45. 
229 Boosey v. Jefferys, PRO E13/1366, rot. 63 (Exch. Pl. Mich. 1849; judg. Pas. 1850). 
230 Boosey v. Jefferys, 6 Ex. 580, 583–86, 15 Jur. 540, 540–41 (Ct. Exch. Chamb. 1851). 
231 6 Ex. at 583–85, 588, 15 Jur. at 541–42, 17 Law Times 110, 110–11; accord Jefferys, 4 H.L.C. 
at 819, 823 (arg.). 
232 6 Ex. at 592 (Lord Campbell, C.J.). 
233 6 Ex. at 592–93, 15 Jur. at 543, 20 Law J. Exch. 354, 355; see also G.S., English Copyright in 
Foreign Compositions, 14 JURIST 46, 47 (Feb. 16, 1850) (noting that “the ground of that decision 
[Donaldson v. Becket] can only be surmised . . . [but] it is plain that [it] did not overrule the prior 
decisions as to the effect of publication” at common law). 
234 Jefferys, 4 H.L.C. at 996. 
235 E.g., id. at 846–47 (Crompton, J.); id. at 874–75 (Erle, J.); id. at 883–84, 888 (Wightman, J.); 
id. at 903, 906 (Coleridge, J.); id. at 920–21 (Parke, B.); id. at 945 (Jervis, C.J.). 
236 Id. at 872 (Erle, J.). 
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property at common law no judgment whatever was pronounced.”237 
The reports of Beckford and Jefferys do not mention the speeches of 
the Lords in Donaldson, and thus we might be tempted to conclude that the 
judges and law Lords were not aware of them. One could then argue that if 
the speeches had been known, the jurists would have characterized 
Donaldson differently. Given the nature of the publications in which the 
case first appeared, access to the speeches many years later might be a 
problem in some instances. Nevertheless, the underlying premise arguably 
does not hold because it is more likely than not that in Beckford and 
Jefferys the judges and law Lords were aware of the speeches. Beckford 
was argued before a judge who had participated in Donaldson, and an 
account of the speeches was readily available as part of a major publication 
on the debates and proceedings of both Houses.238 The speeches later be-
came even more accessible to all of those involved in Jefferys because they 
were reprinted once more in what had, by then, become the standard work 
on parliamentary debates from 1066 to 1803.239 Indeed, it seems very 
unlikely that the law Lords, in particular, would have failed to consult this 
work, which was housed in the library of the House of Lords.240 
In short, I view the aforementioned cases not as mistaken, as my 
colleague does, but as correctly assessing what was decided in Donaldson 
and what was not. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
So what, then, is the correct way to describe the holding in Donaldson? 
The House of Lords held that published works were subject to the 
durational terms of the Statute of Anne, but the reasoning of the decision 
cannot be determined. In advising the House, a number of judges and 
Lords offered their own views of the matter, but none of them singly or in 
combination establishes why the House ruled as it did. Nevertheless, they 
do stand as guidance on what the law was at the time. In this respect, I 
must again agree with Lysander Spooner, who 160 years ago wrote: 
[Donaldson] does not stand as a decision that an author had 
                                                                                                                          
237 Id. at 961 (Lord Brougham); see also id. at 968–69. 
238 See 7 HISTORY, supra note 84, at i, 2. 
239 See 17 COBBETT, supra note 87, at col. 953. 
240 See CHRISTOPHER DOBSON, THE LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS: A SHORT HISTORY 5–6 
(1960); MS Catalogue of the Library of the House of Lords, c.1848, PA HL/PO/LB/1/41. The Gentle-
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impossible to justify based on the judges’ answers or opinions alone. Jefferys, 4 H.L.C. at 823 (arg.); 
see also CASE FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN ERROR 4 ([London], W. Ostell [1852]), PA HL/PO/JU/4/3/135. 
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not a perpetual copyright at common law; but only as a 
decision that, if he had such a right at common law, that right 
had been taken away by the statute. 
 The diversity of opinion, both among the judges and the 
lords, deprive this decision of all weight as an authority. The 
only things really worthy of consideration are the arguments 
urged on the one side and the other.241 
As I have already noted, it was common for observers in the late 18th 
century to read Donaldson and Millar as predominating in favor of an 
antecedent right. This is not surprising. On the strict interpretation of 
Donaldson, Millar remained relevant. And if one combines the views of 
the judges and law Lords from both cases, a majority believed that there 
was a common-law copyright before publication, a slim majority believed 
it was not lost upon publication, and a majority believed the Statute of 
Anne preempted one or both types of antecedent rights. This is not to say 
that only quantitative measures matter. Undoubtedly, in the minds of some 
observers there is a qualitative component as well, wherein experience and 
reputations come into play. Nevertheless, on the whole, the orthodox origin 
of copyright—that authors held a natural or customary property right, 
protected at common law—certainly finds support in the late 18th century. 
A final word. Although I disagree with Abrams and Deazley as to the 
true import of Donaldson, they do correctly point out that many modern 
scholars have misread the decision in the other direction by stating that the 
House of Lords affirmatively held that there was an antecedent right. Most 
instances of this phenomenon, undoubtedly, are accidental and arise from 
the mistaken belief that in 1774 the judges were solely empowered to 
decide appeals in the House of Lords, i.e., that the judges were the House. 
In any case, in light of the foregoing, it is hoped that this too is something 
that will be avoided in the future.  
                                                                                                                          
241 SPOONER, supra note 171, at 212–13; accord JOHN SHORTT, THE LAW RELATING TO WORKS 
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APPENDIX 
The sections below collate—in order of the arguments, opinions, and 
speeches—the various reports that were published. Generally speaking, 
they fall into three categories: narratives (“N”), summaries (“S”), and tallies 
(“T”). A narrative offers some account of what was said. Many narratives 
are lengthy, some over 1,000 words, but others are very short. Summaries 
are always very brief and merely summarize the position a speaker took, 
e.g., that Justice Gould believed that there was a common-law right, but 
that the Statute of Anne preempted it. Tallies track the judges who opined 
for or against perpetual copyright. The number of surviving summaries and 
tallies are numerous. Indeed, there are so many that to list them all for 
every counsel, judge, and Lord would carry this Appendix to over 20 
pages. Consequently, only the section on Justice Nares lists sources of all 
three types. For the remaining participants, I only include narratives.242 
Under each speaker there are one or more main entries; each main 
entry contains material that is unique in some respect. In the case of leng-
thier narratives, we can state with confidence that the source is not only 
unique but original. That is to say, someone with actual knowledge of the 
proceedings likely created it. As the reports become shorter, however, it 
becomes difficult and in some cases impossible to determine if the source 
is based on original reporting or is merely copied from another paper. 
Indentations indicate a source that is clearly derivative of the tier above 
it. Most derivatives are verbatim, while others truncate, paraphrase, or 
otherwise excerpt material. Generally speaking, I have avoided breaking 
down the sources beyond a single level of derivation, even in instances 
where I could confidently determine that a source merited as much, 
because to offer so much detail here would cause the Appendix to become 
unwieldy. There would need to be numerous second, third, and fourth tiers 
of derivation and indentation. I do make a few exceptions, however, for 
some of the principal accounts, viz., the Cases and Cobbett Accounts. 
If two sources are marked with an “=” that means they are so similar 
and close in time that it is likely that they used the same correspondents for 
their reports. Additionally, some newspaper reports draw from more than 
one source, and some newspaper issues contain more than one report. This 
Appendix lists the various sources in order of publication dates and times 
(morning, followed by evening) and otherwise alphabetically. 
A full list of all the newspapers and periodicals consulted, that contain 
material on Donaldson v. Becket, appears at the end of this Appendix.  
                                                                                                                          
242 When time permits, I will publish a variorum report of Donaldson v. Becket. 
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Arguments 
For the Appellants 
February 4, 1774 February 7, 1774 
 
1. Edward Thurlow, AG 2. John Dalrymple 
N London Chron., Feb. 5 N Gazetteer, Feb. 8 
 St. James Chron. (Eve), Feb. 5    =London Chron., Feb. 8 
 Reading Mercury, Feb. 7   General Eve. Post, Feb. 8 
 Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 9  London Eve. Post, Feb. 8 
 Stamford Mercury, Feb. 10  Craftsman, Feb. 12 
 Derby Mercury, Feb. 11  Newcastle Courant, Feb. 12 
 Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 11  Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 12 
 Newcastle Courant, Feb. 12  Hampshire Chron., Feb. 14 
 Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 12  Manchester Mercury, Feb. 15 
 Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18 N Morning Chron., Feb. 8 
 Cobbett Account  Town & Country Magazine, Feb. 
N Morning Chron. Feb. 5  Pleadings Account 
 General Eve. Post, Feb. 5   Cases Account 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 9 N Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 8 
 Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 11  Pleadings Account 
 Aberdeen J., Feb. 14    Cases Account243 
 Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18 N London Chron., Feb. 10 
 Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb.   Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb. 
 Sentimental Magazine, Feb.   Town & Country Magazine, Feb. 
 Town & Country Magazine, Feb.   Gent. & London Magazine, Mar. 
 Pleadings Account  Scots Magazine, Mar. 
  Cases Account  Cobbett Account 
 Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.  N Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 11 
 Scots Magazine, Mar.   Aberdeen J., Feb. 21 
 Cobbett Account N Morning Chron., Feb. 11 
N Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 5  N Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 12 
N Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 8  Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18 
 Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 11  
N Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 9  
 Aberdeen J., Feb. 14  
N Pleadings Account  
 Cases Account 
  
                                                                                                                          
243 This account inserts an imaginary act of Parliament—An Act for the Encouragement of 
Planting—that Dalrymple used during argument but that was expressly omitted from the Middlesex 
Journal and Pleadings Account. The invented act probably circulated separately in print, for the use of 
the Lords, but no stand-alone copies appear to have survived. CASES, supra note 76, at 22–24. 
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For the Respondents 
February 8, 1774 
3. Alexander Wedderburn, SG 4. John Dunning 
N Gazetteer, Feb. 9 N Gazetteer, Feb. 9 
 General Eve. Post, Feb. 10  General Eve. Post, Feb. 10 
 London Eve. Post, Feb. 10  London Eve. Post, Feb. 10 
 Craftsman, Feb. 12  Craftsman, Feb. 12 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 14  Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 14 
 Stamford Mercury, Feb. 17  Stamford Mercury, Feb. 17 
 Derby Mercury, Feb. 18  Derby Mercury, Feb. 18 
N Morning Chron., Feb. 9 N Morning Chron., Feb. 9 
 London Chron., Feb. 10  London Chron., Feb. 10 
  Cobbett Account   Cobbett Account 
 Sentimental Magazine, Feb.  Leeds Intelligencer, Feb. 15 
 Pleadings Account  Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb. 
  Cases Account244  Sentimental Magazine, Feb. 
 Scots Magazine, Mar.  Town & Country Magazine, Feb. 
N Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 12  Pleadings Account 
 Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18   Cases Account 
N Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 12  Gent. & London Magazine, Mar. 
 Town & Country Magazine, Feb.  Scots Magazine, Mar. 
N Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 15 N Public Adv., Feb. 9 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 16  Ipswich J., Feb. 12 
 Aberdeen J., Feb. 21 N Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 10 
    Public Hue & Cry, Feb. 11 
    Pleadings Account 
     Cases Account 
   N Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 12 
    Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18 
   N Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 15 
    Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 16 
    Aberdeen J., Feb. 21 
  
                                                                                                                          
244 This account briefly mentions a case, Baskett v. Woodfall, PRO C33/417, ff. 337v–338r (Ch. 
1762), that was not mentioned in the Pleadings Account. CASES, supra note 76, at 28. 
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For the Appellants—Reply 
February 9, 1774 
5. Edward Thurlow, AG 
N London Chron., Feb. 10 N Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 15 
   =Public Adv., Feb. 10   Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 16 
 Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 12   Aberdeen J., Feb. 21 
 Northampton Mercury, Feb. 14 
 Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 15 
 Dublin J., Feb. 17 
 Aberdeen J., Feb. 21 
N Morning Chron., Feb. 10 
 London Chron., Feb. 12 
  Cobbett Account 
 Scots Magazine, Mar. 
N Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 10 
 Public Hue & Cry, Feb. 11 
N Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 14 
Questions Posed to the Judges 
February 9, 1774 
London Chron., Feb. 10 Morning Chron., Feb. 10† 
 General Eve. Post, Feb. 10  Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 15 
 London Eve. Post, Feb. 10  Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb. 
 St. James Chron. (Eve), Feb. 10  Sentimental Magazine, Feb. 
 Gazetteer, Feb. 11  Town & Country Magazine, Feb. 
 Craftsman, Feb. 12  Pleadings Account 
 Ipswich J., Feb. 12   Cases Account 
 Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 12  Gent. & London Magazine, Mar. 
 Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 14  Scots Magazine, Mar. 
 Hampshire Chron., Feb. 14 Public Adv., Feb. 10 
 Northampton Mercury, Feb. 14 Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 10 
 Reading Mercury, Feb. 14  Public Hue & Cry, Feb. 11 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 14  Public Register, Feb. 17 
 Bath Chron., Feb. 17 Morning Chron., Feb. 15† 
 Dublin J., Feb. 17  Printed Journal† 
 Stamford Mercury, Feb. 17  Cobbett Account 
 Derby Mercury, Feb. 18 
 Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18 
 Newcastle Courant, Feb. 19 
 Aberdeen J., Feb. 21 
 London Magazine, Feb. 
 Annual Register 1774 
                                                                                                                          
† These sources (and their derivatives) are nearly identical. 
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Opinions 
February 15, 1774 
1. Baron James Eyre, EX 2. Justice George Nares, CP 
N Morning Chron., Feb. 16 S Gazetteer, Feb. 16 
 Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 17  General Eve. Post, Feb. 17 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 23  London Eve. Post, Feb. 17 
 Sentimental Magazine, Feb.  Craftsman, Feb. 19 
N London Chron., Feb. 17  Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 19 
 Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22  Westminster J., Feb. 19 
 Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24  Hampshire Chron., Feb. 21 
 Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 25  Derby Mercury, Feb. 25 
 Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb.  N Morning Chron., Feb. 16 
 Pleadings Account  London Chron., Feb. 17 
  Cases Account   Cobbett Account 
 Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.  Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 17 
 Scots Magazine, Apr.  Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 23 
 Cobbett Account  Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 25 
N Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 19  Sentimental Magazine, Feb. 
 Glasgow J., Feb. 24  Pleadings Account 
N Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb.   Cases Account 
 Pleadings Account  Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar. 
  Cases Account  Gent. & London Magazine, Apr. 
 Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.  Scots Magazine, Apr. 
   S Public Adv., Feb. 16 245 
3. Justice William Ashurst, KB  Ipswich J., Feb. 19 
N Morning Chron., Feb. 16 T Bath Chron., Feb. 17 
 London Chron., Feb. 17 S Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 19† 
  Cobbett Account  Glasgow J., Feb. 24† 
 Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 17 T Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 19 
 Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22    =Public Adv., Feb. 19 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 23  Glocester J., Feb. 21 
 Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24  Northampton Mercury, Feb. 21 
 Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 25  Reading Mercury, Feb. 21 
 Sentimental Magazine, Feb.  Leeds Intelligencer, Feb. 22 
 Pleadings Account  Manchester Mercury, Feb. 22 
  Cases Account  Bath Chron., Feb. 24 
 Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar. S Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 19 
 Gent. & London Magazine, Apr. T Westminster J., Feb. 19 
 Scots Magazine, Apr.  General Eve. Post, Feb. 19 
N Public Adv., Feb. 16  London Eve. Post, Feb. 19 
 Ipswich J., Feb. 19  Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 19 
 Town & Country Magazine, Feb.  St. James Chron. (Eve), Feb. 19 
    Hampshire Chron., Feb. 21 
  
                                                                                                                          
245 Woodfall was likely the source for the Public Advertiser. See supra notes 144 & 167. 
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4. Justice William Blackstone, CP  Stamford Mercury, Feb. 24 
    Derby Mercury, Feb. 25 
There are no published opinions or  Newcastle Courant, Feb. 26 
narratives for Justice Blackstone.  Dublin J., Mar. 1 
Blackstone was ill with the gout, so   Public Register, Mar. 1 
Justice Ashurst read his answers to T Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 19† 
the Lords.246 All that remains is  S Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22† 
brief summaries and tallies, which  Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24† 
are not reproduced here.  Aberdeen J., Feb. 28† 
   T Public Adv., Feb. 22 
    Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 22 
    Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 26 
    Hampshire Chron., Feb. 28 
    Leinster J., Mar. 5 
    Public Register, Mar. 5 
   T Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 23† 
    Aberdeen J., Feb. 28† 
   T Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 23† 
    Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 25† 
    Aberdeen J., Feb. 28† 
   T Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 25† 
    Aberdeen J., Feb. 28† 
   S Town & Country Magazine, Feb.† 
   T Westminster Magazine, Feb. 
   T Scots Magazine, Apr. 
   S Burrow Report† 
   T Brown Report† 
   S Printed Journal† 
February 17, 1774 
5. Justice Edward Willes, KB 6. Justice Richard Aston, KB 
N Morning Chron., Feb. 18 N Morning Chron., Feb. 18 & 19 
 London Chron., Feb. 19  London Chron., Feb. 19 & 22 
  Cobbett Account   Cobbett Account 
 Sentimental Magazine, Feb.  Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 26 
 Pleadings Account  Sentimental Magazine, Feb. 
  Cases Account  Pleadings Account 
 Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.   Cases Account 
 Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.   Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar. 
 Scots Magazine, Apr.  Gent. & London Magazine, Apr. 
    Scots Magazine, Apr. 
    Cobbett Account 
  
                                                                                                                          
246 WEEKLY MAGAZINE (Edinburgh), Feb. 24, 1774, at 286 (“He only answered the questions in 
general, without going into the argument.”). 
† These sources agree with the manuscript journal on Justice Nares’s views. 
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7. Baron George Perrot, EX 8. Justice Henry Gould, CP 
N Morning Chron., Feb. 19 N Morning Chron., Feb. 21 
 London Chron., Feb. 22  London Chron., Feb. 24 
  Cobbett Account   Cobbett Account 
 Edin. Eve. Courant, Feb. 26 & Mar. 2  Sentimental Magazine, Feb. 
 Pleadings Account  Pleadings Account 
  Cases Account   Cases Account 
 Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.  Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar. 
 Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.  Gent. & London Magazine, Apr. 
 Scots Magazine, Apr.  Scots Magazine, Apr. 
N Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22 N Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22 
 Edinburgh Eve., Feb. 23  Edinburgh Eve., Feb. 23 
 Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24  Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24 
  
9. Baron Richard Adams, EX 
N Morning Chron., Feb. 21 
 London Chron., Feb. 24 
  Cobbett Account 
 Sentimental Magazine, Feb. 
 Weekly Magazine, Mar. 3 
 Pleadings Account 
  Cases Account 
 Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar. 
 Gent. & London Magazine, Apr. 
 Scots Magazine, Apr. 
N Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 23 
 Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24 
N Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 23 
February 21, 1774 
10. Chief Baron Sidney Smythe, EX 11. Ch. J. William De Grey, CP 
N Morning Chron., Feb. 22 N Public Adv., Feb. 22 
 London Chron., Feb. 24  Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 22 
 Town & Country Magazine, Feb.  St. James Chron. (Eve), Feb. 22 
 Weekly Magazine, Mar. 3  Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 26 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Mar. 7  Hampshire Chron., Feb. 28 
 Pleadings Account  Reading Mercury, Feb. 28 
  Cases Account   Westminster Magazine, Feb. 
 Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.  Dublin J., Mar. 3 
  Cobbett Account N Morning Chron., Feb. 23 
 Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.   Town & Country Magazine, Feb. 
 Scots Magazine, Apr.  Pleadings Account 
     Cases Account 
    Gentleman’s Magazine, Apr. 
     Cobbett Account 
    Scots Magazine, Apr. 
    Gent. & London Magazine, May 
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   N London Chron., Feb. 24 
    Weekly Magazine, Mar. 3 
   N Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 25 
    Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 26 
    Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 26 
Speeches 
February 22, 1774 
1. Charles Pratt, Lord Camden 2. Henry Bathurst, L.C. Apsley 
N Public Adv., Feb. 23 N Public Adv., Feb. 23 
 London Chron., Feb. 24  London Chron., Feb. 24 
 Ipswich J., Feb. 26  Ipswich J., Feb. 26 
 Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 26  Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 26 
 Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 26  Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 26 
 Glocester J., Feb. 28  Glocester J., Feb. 28 
 Manchester Mercury, Mar. 1  Manchester Mercury, Mar. 1 
 Bath Chron., Mar. 3  Bath Chron., Mar. 3 
 Derby Mercury, Mar. 4  Derby Mercury, Mar. 4 
 Dublin J., Mar. 5  Dublin J., Mar. 5 
 Leinster J., Mar. 9  Leinster J., Mar. 9 
 Hibernian Magazine, Mar.  Scots Magazine, May 
N Morning Chron., Feb. 24 & 25 N London Eve. Post, Feb. 24 
 London Chron., Feb. 26 & Mar. 1    =Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 24 
  Cobbett Account  Northampton Mercury, Feb. 28 
 St. James’s Magazine, Feb.   Reading Mercury, Feb. 28 
 Town & Country Magazine, Feb.  Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 28 
 Edinburgh Adv., Mar. 4  Leeds Intelligencer, Mar. 1 
 Caledonian Mercury, Mar. 7 & 9   Newcastle Courant, Mar. 5 
 Pleadings Account  Public Register, Mar. 5 
  Cases Account  Universal Magazine, Mar. 
 Weekly Magazine, Mar. 10  Debrett Account 
 Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Mar. 11  N Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 26. 
 Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.  Glasgow J., Mar. 3 
 Gentleman’s Magazine, Apr.  Aberdeen J., Mar. 7 
 Scots Magazine, May  N Morning Chron., Feb. 26 
N London Eve. Post, Feb. 24  London Chron., Mar. 5  
   =Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 24   Cobbett Account 
 Northampton Mercury, Feb. 28  Pleadings Account 
 Reading Mercury, Feb. 28   Cases Account 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 28  Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Mar. 9 
 Leeds Intelligencer, Mar. 1  N Edinburgh Adv., Mar. 1 
 Newcastle Courant, Mar. 5  
 Public Register, Mar. 5 
 Universal Magazine, Mar. 
 Debrett Account 
N Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 26 
 Glasgow J., Mar. 3 
 Aberdeen J., Mar. 7 
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N London Eve. Post, Feb. 26 
 Bath Chron., Mar. 3 
N Edinburgh Adv., Mar. 1 
 
3. Thomas Lyttelton, Lord Lyttelton 4. Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle 
N London Eve. Post, Feb. 24 N London Eve. Post, Feb. 24 
   =Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 24    =Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 24 
 Northampton Mercury, Feb. 28  Northampton Mercury, Feb. 28 
 Reading Mercury, Feb. 28  Reading Mercury, Feb. 28 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 28  Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 28 
 Edinburgh Adv., Mar. 1  Leeds Intelligencer, Mar. 1 
 Leeds Intelligencer, Mar. 1  Newcastle Courant, Mar. 5 
 Newcastle Courant, Mar. 5  Public Register, Mar. 5 
 Public Register, Mar. 5  Universal Magazine, Mar. 
 Universal Magazine, Mar.  Debrett Account 
 Debrett Account   Cobbett Account 
  Cobbett Account N Morning Chron., Feb. 26 
N Morning Chron., Feb. 26  Pleadings Account 
 Pleadings Account   Cases Account 
  Cases Account N General Eve. Post, Mar. 10 
N General Eve. Post, Mar. 10  
 
5. Thomas Howard, Earl of Effingham 
N Public Adv., Feb. 23 N Morning Chron., Feb. 26 
 London Chron., Feb. 24  London Eve. Post, Feb. 26 
 Ipswich J., Feb. 26  Stamford Mercury, Mar. 3 
 Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 26  Westminster J., Mar. 5 
 Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 26  Pleadings Account 
 Glocester J., Feb. 28   Cases Account 
 Manchester Mercury, Mar. 1 N General Eve. Post, Mar. 10 
 Bath Chron., Mar. 3 
 Derby Mercury, Mar. 4 
 Dublin J., Mar. 5 
 Leinster J., Mar. 9 
 Hibernian Magazine, Mar. 
 Scots Magazine, May 
N London Eve. Post, Feb. 24 
   =Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 24 
 Northampton Mercury, Feb. 28 
 Reading Mercury, Feb. 28 
 Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 28 
 Leeds Intelligencer, Mar. 1 
 Newcastle Courant, Mar. 5 
 Public Register, Mar. 5 
 Universal Magazine, Mar. 
 Debrett Account 
  Cobbett Account  
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Full Names of British and Irish Newspapers and Periodicals  
that Contain Material on Donaldson v. Becket 
England 
The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, For 
the Year 1774 (London) 
The Bath Chronicle 
The Craftsman; or Say’s Weekly Journal (London) 
Drewry’s Derby Mercury 
The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London) 
The General Evening Post (London) 
The Gentleman’s Magazine, and Historical Chronicle (London) 
The Glocester Journal 
The Hampshire Chronicle: Or, Winchester, Southampton, and Portsmouth 
 Mercury (Southampton) 
The Ipswich Journal 
Jackson’s Oxford Journal 
The Lady’s Magazine; or Entertaining Companion for the Fair Sex 
 (London) 
The Leeds Intelligencer 
The London Chronicle 
The London Evening-Post 
The London Magazine: Or, Gentleman’s Monthly Intelligencer 
The Manchester Mercury and Harrop’s General Advertiser 
Middlesex Journal, and Evening Advertiser (London) 
The Monthly Review; or, Literary Journal: From July to December 1774 
(London) 
The Morning Chronicle, and London Advertiser 
The Morning Post, and Daily Advertiser (London) 
The Newcastle Courant 
The Northampton Mercury 
The Public Advertiser (London) 
The Public Hue and Cry; or, Sir John Fielding’s General Preventive Plan 
(London) 
The Reading Mercury, and Oxford Gazette (Reading) 
The St. James’s Chronicle; Or, British Evening-Post (London) 
The St. James’s Magazine: or Memoirs of Our Own Times (London) 
The Sentimental Magazine; or, General Assemblage of Science, Taste, and 
 Entertainment (London) 
The Shrewsbury Chronicle, Or, Wood’s British Gazette 
The Stamford Mercury 
The Town and Country Magazine; or Universal Repository of Knowledge, 
 Instruction, and Entertainment (London) 
The Universal Magazine of Knowledge and Pleasure (London) 
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The Weekly Magazine; or, Polite Register of Literature, Politics and News 
(London)247 
The Westminster Journal: And London Political Miscellany (London)248 
The Westminster Magazine; or, The Pantheon of Taste (London) 
Scotland 
The Aberdeen Journal; and North-British Magazine 
The Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh) 
The Edinburgh Advertiser 
The Edinburgh Evening Courant 
The Edinburgh Magazine and Review 
The Gentleman and Lady’s Weekly Magazine (Edinburgh)249 
Glasgow Journal 
The Scots Magazine (Edinburgh) 
The Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Amusement 
Ireland 
The Dublin Journal, George Faulkner 
The Gentleman’s and London Magazine: or, Monthly Chronologer 
 (Dublin) 
Hibernian Magazine, or Compendium of Entertaining Knowledge (Dublin) 
The Leinster Journal (Kilkenny), Edmund Finn 
The Public Register: Or, Freeman’s Journal (Dublin) 
 
                                                                                                                          
247 I was unable to review this periodical because the relevant issues appear to have perished. 
Should they ever reappear, an advertisement indicates that issue 5 reported the principal arguments of 
counsel on both sides. MORNING POST (London), Feb. 14, 1774, at 1 (advertisement). 
248 I was unable to locate a surviving copy of the February 26 issue of this weekly periodical. 
249 I was unable to locate a surviving copy of the March 4 or 18 issues of this weekly periodical. 

